

MAKE POVERTY HISTORY

2005 Campaign Evaluation

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MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY

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Prepared for the **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** Coordination Team.

By

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This is the report of independent evaluators commissioned by the **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** Coordination Team. The views expressed in this report should not be taken as being those of the **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** Coordination Team or Assembly members.

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Executive Summary



Executive Summary

Overview

2005 was a significant moment for development campaigning. The UK presidencies of the EU and G8, as well as UN meetings and WTO negotiations presented a unique opportunity to make progress in the campaign against global poverty.

MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY was established as a coalition to make the most of this opportunity. Launched in January 2005, it grew to 540 members representing most sections of UK civil society. Its objectives were to:

- Achieve policy change in 2005 in the areas of more and better aid, debt relief and trade justice
- Create an unstoppable momentum for change in 2005
- Leave the public committed to further change beyond 2005

This evaluation assesses the impact of the campaign and how successful it was in meeting these objectives.

The public mobilisation was felt to be the greatest achievement of the campaign.

MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY not only managed to make almost everyone in the country aware of the campaign, it inspired a significant proportion to participate – many for the first time. Church and faith groups provided an important bridge between traditional activists and first-time campaigners.

As a political and parliamentary lobby, the campaign dominated the year. There was massive support for the campaign from politicians of all parties.

In terms of policy change, it was felt that the campaign could point to real achievements on aid and debt. On trade, there was felt to have been little practical success, although the very fact that trade and development were linked together was felt to be an important step in building an international consensus. The changes in rhetoric within the EU (especially within DG Trade) were felt to be evidence of this, though there was institutionally little change.

The effectiveness of the coalition was thought to be the combination of:

- The fact that coalition members committed to work together
- The popular communications. This included the brand, the portfolio of tools used, media coverage, celebrity support, Live8 and the Edinburgh rally
- The policy research and lobbying that supported the communications

Many of the things that made a difference were popular, mass-market campaigning approaches. Where these things were less in evidence, external interviews suggested that there was less of an impact.

In light of these successes, four areas were identified where the coalition had faced

challenges. Although worth further debate, interviewees felt that they had to be placed in their proper context. Issues raised were:

- The impact of the **leadership model**. Whilst this was felt to be vital to holding the coalition together, it led to slow and reactive decision-making
- The challenge of **co-ordinating responses** in a broad coalition. This was difficult because of the lack of a central spokesperson, but also because of differences within the coalition on how to communicate progress and engage with government
- The extent to which **public momentum** could be sustained and the work needed to maintain these levels of interest
- The extent to which the coalition was seen as **a British campaign**, rather than an international campaign. In the run-up to the G8 Summit at Gleneagles, Live8 is felt to have had significant influence with other G8 governments

Local campaigners were most impressed with the public awareness achieved by the campaign. They felt that this, alongside the brand and unity of the coalition, gave them a catalyst to work together locally. However, because they are so pleased with what was achieved, they are concerned about next steps and public momentum. Many felt that the major agencies were responsible for these issues and should work hard to preserve the legacy of the campaign.

The campaign was deliberately established with a highly decentralised and consensual management structure. Regardless of any perceived imperfections, the general consensus was that the ways of working delivered results.

Internally, the ways of working were thought to have been effective at promoting coalition unity, mobilising supporters and harnessing the energy of the members. By allowing the campaign to run a broad portfolio of complementary activities, they contributed to the coalition's objectives.

The ways of working were less effective at resolving tension and taking strategic decisions. The ad-hoc structure placed heavy demands on those involved centrally. As a result, although members recognise the importance of coalition working, many are reluctant to commit to future coalitions without conditions attached.

Internal and external interviews point to some common themes. These have been translated into six broad lessons learned.

The campaign brought the issues of international development into the mainstream of UK politics. The challenge for coalition members is to consolidate the achievements of 2005, both in the UK and internationally, as a platform for a global campaign.

Lessons learned:

This evaluation draws six lessons from 2005. To put them in context, one special advisor said:

“Most lessons to take from the year are definitely positive. The question is how you can maintain this momentum now you’re in a different era.”

Future coalitions will be more successful if they develop a view about these issues at an early stage:

Leadership

- Coalitions need to understand the trade-offs between leadership and consensus

Planning

- Planning strategically – for the long term - is different from tactically responding to external conditions. Coalitions need to do both

Working with different types of organisation

- Different organisations have different needs. As coalitions grow, they need to accommodate diversity

Agreeing public and political positioning

- Campaigns need to agree their strategy on overall public and political positioning at the outset, or at least agree how to manage differences between members

Using popular communications tools

- Mass-market popular communications, backed up by solid lobbying and traditional activism, have significant political impact

Building relationships with supporters

- Campaigns need to plan to take new supporters on a journey from interest to activism

Next Steps:

2005 was an unprecedented public mobilisation that achieved real policy change. Whilst the campaign was only ever established as a one-year mobilisation, all involved recognise that meeting the challenge of global poverty requires a sustained, long-term and global effort.

The campaign has already taken a number of decisions about the future. It was decided at the final Assembly meeting that the core networks would form the heart of future campaigning on economic justice issues. Member agencies and individuals would be encouraged to join the relevant campaigning organisations and networks. BOND (British Overseas NGOs for Development) would manage the UK representation on GCAP (the Global Call to Action against Poverty) and Assembly members may continue to use the brand, within agreed guidelines.

During the evaluation process, interviewees were asked what they thought the highest priorities were for future work. In most cases, these views were given without knowing the actual plans that were in place. In general, there was huge support for the campaign and a view that it could and should sustain a popular, broad based campaign about global poverty.

Recommendations for next steps came under two headings:

- i) Consolidate the achievements of 2005
- ii) Use 2005 as a platform

Consolidate the achievements of 2005:

- **Retain the coherence of the coalition.** In terms of lobbying MPs, motivating the public and galvanising local campaigners, the co-ordinated communications and coalition working made a significant difference. The coalition members should retain as much coherence as they can and commit to retain elements of co-ordination, strategic planning and communications.
- **Keep pressure on the UK government.** The promises of Gleneagles need to be held to account. The government should be challenged to recognise that in an interdependent world, there are policy issues in every government department that have an impact on development.
- **Keep communicating with the public, especially the newly engaged.** The public mobilisation had a significant impact on both the UK and international governments and demonstrated a clear public enthusiasm for these issues. The campaign needs to build a lasting relationship with the public, communicating to them the impact of their involvement and the benefits of continued involvement. Coalition members need to embrace continued use of popular communications tools and build those skills into their organisations.

Use 2005 as a platform:

- **Take forward the debate on trade.** Campaigning on trade issues is fundamentally harder than campaigning for aid and debt relief. The arguments have not been

won, outcomes are hard to judge and progress relies on slow-moving, multilateral institutions. The campaign needs to push for a consensus on trade issues, with a clear programme of action and a co-ordinated campaign of international lobbying.

- **Put pressure on G8 and EU countries.** Sustaining pressure on the UK without also pressuring other governments will not yield many further dividends. Coalition members need to work out how to best influence international governments and institutions and work towards an international consensus for reform.
- **Help support Southern civil society.** Building ownership of these issues in the South will have two impacts. It will increase pressure on Southern governments (particularly in Africa) to commit to development and it will increase the legitimacy of the arguments if they are owned and supported by the South. GCAP is understood to be building towards this. However whilst this might be a desirable outcome, some resisted this as next step for the UK, because it implied that it was the role of the UK to create Southern actions.

Introduction



1 Introduction

1.1 Aims and Terms of Reference

This report has been commissioned by the **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** campaign to evaluate its impact in 2005 and the reasons for this impact. It also aims to draw out next steps for the campaign and lessons for future coalitions.

The terms of reference (attached in appendix) ask three questions:

- 1. What progress did the coalition make against its objectives during 2005?
- 2. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the coalition's approach and set up?
- 3. What lessons can be learned for the future?

The objectives that required evaluation were given as:

- Policy change in 2005
- An unstoppable momentum for change in 2005
- Public committed to further change beyond 2005


The second question requires an evaluation of the structures, systems and procedures established by the campaign. These are to be evaluated with respect to the following: the coalition's goals and unity; their contribution to engagement and mobilisation; their suitability and effectiveness for decision-making, strategic direction; operational effectiveness and managing relations with other civil society actors.

Finally, the evaluation is asked to draw lessons for future coalition activity on economic justice issues. This was understood as capturing views on what worked in the year, as well as suggesting practical next steps for coalition members.

1.2 Structure

After this introduction, this report is broken into six sections, as follows:

REPORT STRUCTURE AND KEY THEMES



Section 2 describes how the coalition came together, how it was structured and resourced. It also provides a timeline of the key dates in 2005.

Section 3 describes how the work of the coalition was perceived externally – particularly by members of the UK Government. This looks at the impact the campaign had over 2005 on the public, as a parliamentary lobby and in terms of policy change. It also captures other observations made by interviewees about how the campaign worked.

Section 4 covers how grassroots campaigners viewed the campaign and what they think should happen next.

Section 5 looks at “ways of working”. This is a review of the internal structures used to manage the coalition.

Section 6 is about “Lessons learned,” and offers some views on how future coalitions should think about the trade-offs between leadership and consensus, working together and campaign communications.

Section 7 gives a view on what interviewees think the coalition members should do next, in terms of policy analysis, public mobilisation and political advocacy.

1.3 Approach

This evaluation pulls together the views of a wide range of stakeholders and incorporates research and evaluation work already done in this area. The key activities are:

- A review of internal documentation, including key minutes, policy notes and organisation charts
- An in-depth interview programme divided into three streams i) Internal interviews (Co-ordination Team, working group chairs, others) ii) External interviews (policymakers, journalists, academics and other commentators) and iii) Local campaign groups
- Incorporating findings from evaluation work already underway. This is far more quantitative in scope than our interview work
- Incorporating the quantitative and qualitative work done on the public perceptions of poverty

It is not our intention to provide a full list of interviewees, as people participated in this evaluation on the condition of anonymity. It was felt that this would encourage people to be candid and help the coalition learn the lessons of 2005. During the course of this process we have completed over 70 interviews. From outside the coalition we have spoken to:

- Ministers, special advisors and senior officials from the Treasury, DFID, Foreign Office, DTI and 10 Downing St
- MPs and Peers from Labour, Conservative and the Liberal Democrats.
- GCAP, EU campaigners, EU special advisors and African campaigners to provide an international perspective

- Others with a useful perspective, including: journalists; academics; think tanks and Live8 organisers
- Grassroots campaigners and representatives of local groups

Inside the coalition, we have spoken to members of the Co-ordination Team (CT) and Working Groups, as well as issuing a questionnaire to all members of the assembly. Sixty-two responses were returned, providing a sample of 11%. The majority of respondents were NGOs (58%), the sample also included responses from domestic sector voluntary organisations, faith groups, not for profit businesses, unions and professional associations.

Responses from large and small organisations were broadly similar (24 and 28 respectively), with 10 responses from medium sized organisations. 38 respondents were active in the Assembly, 32 in Working Groups and 13 in CT.

Our approach has been deliberately participative. Rather than seek to offer a definitive view, we have attempted to present the consensus of internal and external opinion.

1.4 Limitations

Given the constraints of time and budget, an evaluation like this can only seek to address a representative sample of opinion. An evaluation can never be definitive and comprehensive, so it was felt that the opinions of those who were targets of the campaign, critics of the campaigns or particularly close to the campaign would be of most value in terms of learning the lessons of 2005.

There are other, specific areas, where we feel further work is necessary.

The first is an evaluation of the international impact of the campaign. A GCAP evaluation is already underway. This work should seek to understand what has influenced policy positions on the campaign's agenda in countries other than the UK. This evaluation has worked to build an in-depth picture of impact in terms of the UK government. Similar work, focused on the other G8 countries, major EU members and the European Commission would be valuable.

The second area is a full review and analysis of all communications activity conducted by the campaign. Whilst there is a plan to document and archive all communications, there would be value in a detailed review of how the communications brief (to the extent that it formally existed) was understood and executed. Further quantitative research should be done to understand which elements of the communications had the greatest impact on different audiences.

Finally, more detailed evaluation on public awareness is required. The long-term impact of the campaign in changing attitudes to poverty and campaigning needs far more robust data than are currently available.

Background



2 Background

2.1 Summary

This section explores how the coalition formed prior to 2005 and how an informal grouping of NGOs grew to a campaign of 540 members from many different sections of society. It also outlines the key moments in 2005.

It then provides an outline of the management structure established by the campaign and the key assumptions behind the decisions not to establish a central secretariat and to have a “facilitative” chair rather than strong central leadership.

2.2 History of the coalition

2.2.1 The establishment and growth of the coalition

By 2003, NGOs had identified 2005 as an important year for UK development campaigning, with the UK Presidencies of the G8 and EU, plus the likelihood of a further WTO Ministerial that year.

An initial meeting to discuss options for joint action took place in October 2003, attended by 20 people from around ten campaigning NGOs, as well as representatives of the Trade Justice Movement (TJM) and Jubilee Debt Campaign (JDC).

The main output was a letter sent to the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, outlining the opportunities for action in 2005 on global economic justice – including aid, trade and debt – and on climate change.

Joint preparations for a Treasury conference in February of 2004 led to further thinking about priorities for 2005, and at this point NGOs narrowed down their priority campaign objectives to financing for development and trade justice.

There was a desire to support existing networks in these fields, hence the inclusion of both TJM and JDC from the outset. By the spring of 2004, the informal group had grown substantially and BOND had been asked to join and play a role. A fourth network, the Stop AIDS Campaign, joined later.

A meeting in the spring of 2004, attended by around 40 organisations, established an interim steering group for the 2005 mobilisation. This group agreed a structure and draft terms of reference for what were to become the Co-ordination Team (CT) and Assembly.

A proposal for the interim steering group to become the CT was rejected by the wider group in favour of formal elections. These took place at the first Assembly meeting in May 2004. From then on, CT met fortnightly, with additional awaydays to consider specific issues. The Assembly met around every eight weeks.

Coalition membership expanded rapidly, growing from around 40 founding organisations to 63 by the time of the second Assembly meeting in October 2004. After the launch in January 2005, membership reached 180 organisations, almost doubling again to 340 by March. It reached 500 members by the time of the G8 in July and finally totalled 540 members.

This expansion was clearly a surprise to some founding members, who claim that at the outset, they had envisaged that the coalition would only grow to around 50 or 60 members. While the bulk of campaign members – around two-thirds – were international NGOs, the coalition successfully recruited:

- 45 trades union and students union,
- 47 faith groups,
- 62 domestic sector voluntary organisations,
- 26 development education organisations
- plus a small number of research establishments, not for profit businesses, funding organisations and media organisations.

However, despite this growth, there was never any fundamental review of the decision-making structures of the campaign.

2.2.2 Key moments in 2005

The 2005 mobilisation was structured around a number of key moments:

Date	Event
January	Launch of campaign
1 st January	Vicar of Dibley watched by 10 million
13 th January	Vicars March to Downing Street
3 rd February	Nelson Mandela speaks in Trafalgar Square
11 th March	Special films played on Red Nose Day
31 st March	Click Ad road block
10 th April	Global Week of Action on Trade. Wake Up to Trade Justice vigil attended by 25,000 people
24 th April	World Poverty Day during General Election, speeches from all major party leaders
1 st July	White Band Day I
2 nd July	Edinburgh Rally. Attended by quarter of a million people. Live8 concerts around the world
6-8 th July	G8 Summit
10 th September	White Band Day II. Activities at sporting events in UK
14 th -16 th September	UN World Summit, New York
2 nd November	Mass Lobby for Trade Justice. 8,000 campaigners lobbied 375 MPs
10 th December	White Band Day III 750,000 votes for Trade Justice handed in to Downing Street
13 th -18 th December	WTO Ministerial, Hong Kong

2.3 The coalition structure

2.3.1 Key assumptions behind the chosen model

The chosen structure was distinct from previous large campaigns in two main respects:

- There was no central secretariat
- There was a “facilitative” chair with leadership of the overall mobilisation vested in the Coordination Team

These decisions were based on two key assumptions, drawn from NGO experience of working together in coalitions such as Jubilee 2000 and TJM.

Founding members wanted to create an innovative and inclusive model that successfully harnessed the energies of all members. They also wanted to strengthen, rather than replicate existing organisations and networks. Experience suggested that if a central secretariat was established, coalition members would not get deeply involved, assuming that others were doing the work. There were also concerns that a central secretariat could end up pursuing its own agenda.

For some, there was a clear desire to avoid setting up a similar structure to Jubilee2000, which had a high profile and centralised leadership. These concerns contributed to the decision that CT would be led by a “facilitative chair” but that leadership of the overall mobilisation would come from the entire Co-ordination Team, rather than a single figure.

2.3.2 Structure of the coalition

The agreed structure for the mobilisation was based on three tiers that consisted of an Assembly, a Co-ordination Team and Support Centre.

The coalition only formally employed three members of staff during 2005, an administrator, a media co-ordinator and the G8 event co-ordinator. All other activities were undertaken by staff from member organisations and networks, who contributed substantial staff time without charge to the coalition. The initial draft budget for the mobilisation was just over £250,000, rising to a final total of around £860,000 but this covered only central expenditure.

Throughout the year, member agencies consistently covered the costs of campaign materials, events and initiatives, making it practically impossible to put a true figure on the overall cost of the mobilisation.

Full TORs for each tier are attached as an appendix but in summary the structure was as follows:

2.3.3 Assembly

The Assembly consisted of all of the members of the campaign and its role was to:

- Advise and be consulted on strategy;
- Act as a channel for raising queries and concerns;
- Ratify overall strategy and major decisions;

- Elect the Co-ordination Team.

Membership was self-selected on the basis of a commitment to the overall aims of the campaign and a capacity to contribute to it.

2.3.4 The Coordination Team

The Co-ordination Team's (CT) main functions were to:

- Co-ordinate and oversee the working groups, with a CT link to each where possible;
- Propose and communicate strategy and major decisions;
- Decide a mechanism for selecting spokespeople;
- Liaise with parallel bodies in UK and internationally;
- Appoint and receive offers of organisational and financial support;
- Oversee appointment of personnel, support centre, membership;
- Strengthen existing organisations and networks.

Membership was based on:

- 4 networks – JDC, TJM, BOND and Stop AIDS Campaign;
- 10 members elected by the Assembly;
- co-opted members – TUC, Scottish MPH and GCAP

2.3.5 The Support to the Chair Group

This was established to:

- Ensure co-ordination between core working groups;
- Take decisions on behalf of CT within agreed parameters;
- Oversee relationship with the support centre;
- Advise on prioritisation and use of financial resources.

Membership was based on CT link people to key working groups - Media, Policy and Lobbying, Messages, Actions and Communications and G8, plus one or two others to ensure balance.

2.3.6 The Support Centre (provided by BOND)

The Support Centre:

- Acted as a first point of contact for CT and Assembly;
- Shared information with members;
- Held common papers and shared resources;
- Supported CT and managed finances on their behalf.

2.3.7 Working Groups

The campaign had ten Working Groups. Some were established by CT and some came together spontaneously to encourage participation of particular coalition groups. The Groups were:

- Policy and Lobbying Working Group;
- Outreach (later became Organisational Engagement) Working Group;
- Media Working Group;
- G8 Group

- Messages, Actions and Communications Working Group (MAC);
- New Media Working Group;
- Children and Schools Working Group;
- Youth Working Group;
- Churches Working Group;
- Celebrities Working Group.

All groups were open to all members, who were able to subscribe to the relevant D group (a central, secure list giving access to all Group documents and email traffic) and attend Working Group meetings.

External perceptions of the campaign



3 External perceptions of the campaign

3.1 Summary

This section looks at how the campaign was perceived by those who were the focus of its lobbying. It looks at people's understanding of the coalition; its manifesto and the extent to which interviewees agreed with it. It also considers the special conditions of 2005.

This provides the context for understanding the public mobilisation, the parliamentary lobbying and the policy change achieved in the year.

It then looks at the reasons for the coalition's success and considers other issues that were raised by interviewees.

In general, there was a broad consensus around what the campaign had achieved in the year and the reasons behind those achievements.

The manifesto pursued by the coalition was felt to cover the right issues and was largely understood by external interviewees. In contrast there was little understanding about how the campaign was managed and structured. In practice this seems to have had little impact on people's opinions of the campaign.

The greatest achievement of the campaign was felt to be the public mobilisation. The campaign not only managed to make almost everyone in the country aware of the campaign, it inspired a significant proportion to participate.

Many participants were new to campaigning. For many, especially among the young, this was their first political engagement. The role of church groups, who provided a bridge between traditional activists and the newer, younger participants, seems to have been very important and much overlooked.

As a political and parliamentary lobby, the campaign dominated the year. There was massive support for the campaign from politicians of all parties.

In terms of policy change, it was felt that the campaign could point to real achievements on aid and debt. On trade, there was felt to have been little practical success, although the very fact that trade and development were linked together was felt to have been an important step in building an international consensus. The changes in rhetoric within the EU and the willingness of DG Trade to pursue a development agenda were felt to be evidence of this.

The size and breadth of the coalition, alongside the much-admired communications strategy were felt to be the main reasons for the high impact of the campaign. A strong brand, used in a popular way and underpinned by solid policy analysis gave the campaign both reach and credibility.

Arguably, the campaign could not have been more successful in the UK. However, it was

felt that less pressure was applied on international governments in 2005. In the run-up to the G8 summit, Live8 was thought to be very important in this respect.

Some of the other issues addressed by external interviewees included the leadership model, the way a campaign co-ordinates policy responses and the proper relationship between a campaign and government. These issues were felt to have created internal tensions within the coalition and distracted members from the campaign's objectives.

These issues are discussed in this section and presented in the "lessons learned" section as questions that future campaigns should consider carefully.

On the question of momentum and commitment to further change, interviewees feel that International Development is now a mainstream issue in UK politics. However, it is up to the members to maintain the momentum that will sustain the campaign in the longer term. It is also important to help replicate this enthusiasm in other countries.

There is some evidence to suggest that the public do not have a clear view on what was achieved in 2005 and what is happening in the future. This needs to be addressed if the achievements of 2005 are to be consolidated.

These issues are addressed in the "Next Steps" section.

3.2 External understanding of the campaign

In order to evaluate the perceived impact of the campaign, the first step is to establish people's understanding of what it was and what it set out to do.

This section provides an overview of people's understanding of:

- **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** as a campaign
- The **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** manifesto

3.2.1 **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** as a campaign

Members of the public and those interviewed by this evaluation often showed little understanding of "*what the coalition was*".

Recent focus group work with members of the public concluded that "*few people had a clear understanding that MPH is an umbrella campaign for a coalition of charities*" and that "*very few people have a 'joined up' understanding of what MPH is*".

Despite this, interviewees were comfortable with the lack of organisational clarity. The clarity of the manifesto, the brand and the size of the coalition provided interviewees with enough coherence.

It is a point for discussion whether greater organisational clarity would have been desirable. Among decision-makers, there was a clear understanding of the coalition's

manifesto and whilst different coalition members emphasised different points, for the most part (and especially in the first half of 2005) coalition members were thought to be consistent and disciplined in their communication.

Specific areas of confusion included:

- Interviewees who met with agencies were unsure whether they were meeting with “official MPH people” or members of the coalition, or what the difference was
- Many people assumed that there was a secretariat working in the background
- Most people saw Live8 and **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** as the same thing
- Some MPs were unsure whether the Trade lobby in November had been an “official” **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** event

These issues are covered in more detail below.

Members of the government understood that campaign was a wide coalition of charities, faith groups, unions and other organisations. It was also their view that the coalition was a “broad church” of opinion that had *“done well to subsume their differences and come together around some key messages.”*

There was not always a clear understanding of whether those being lobbied by the campaign – MPs, advisors and members of the government - were meeting with coalition members who were *“wearing an official “MPH” hat or not”*. A typical response was that *“there wasn’t a great deal of clarity about what was “MPH” and what wasn’t but that didn’t really matter”*, whilst a Minister agreed with this view, saying that *“when the agencies came to see me, they tended to come as representatives of their organisations, but MPH gave focus and discipline to their conversation – it gave them their agenda for the year.”*

To most interviewees (especially those not directly involved in the G8 summit at Gleneagles) Live8 and **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** were seen *“as essentially the same thing”*. One academic said, *“Live8 and MPH were pretty much indistinguishable”* even though, as one Live8 organiser said, *“there was never any real umbrella that covered both Live8 and MPH. Live8 was Bob [Geldof]. That’s why it got things done.”*

As one senior advisor said *“90% of the time, you could see MPH, [Bob] Geldof, the agencies and the Commission for Africa all moving broadly in the same direction”*. Most people considered this to be a strength, because it was felt that the larger the campaign was perceived to be, the stronger and more influential it became.

People felt that the campaign had a much lower profile in the second half of 2005, particularly after the G8. In the second half of the year, the agenda moved onto trade issues. Some felt the messages were less consistent, policy asks less clear and that agencies were thought to be operating more independently. Some noted the low profile of the campaign at the time of the Hong Kong talks.

Some MPs also commented that they were unsure about the relationship of the TJM event

(Wake Up to Trade Justice) to the rest of the campaign. They felt it had been branded differently to other events in 2005.

In most cases in 2005, the **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** brand had been used as the headline and other brands had been used as subtitles. In the Trade Justice Movement's (TJM) event TJM and **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** were co-branded. This was thought to have limited its effectiveness, given the widespread goodwill and support enjoyed by the **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** brand.

When considering the impact of the campaign in the year, it is important to remember that many interviewees defined "**MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY**" in the widest possible terms. For example, there is a consensus among those close to the G8 negotiations that the reason international governments moved their positions in the run-up to Gleneagles can be attributed largely to Live8. Many of those people considered Live8 to be more or less part of the coalition.

3.2.2 The **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** manifesto

Interviewees mostly agreed that the manifesto pursued by the campaign was the right one. The "*trinity of aid, debt and trade was right,*" according to one senior advisor. The general view was summed up by a civil servant, who said, "*I often felt that the message was simplistic, but it was never wrong*".

Interviewees agreed that the focus on "*justice not charity*" was a good decision and a big step for campaigning. The focus on governments and "*structures not symptoms*" was an effective approach that was communicated well.

A key part of this was the decision not to raise money, which was also supported and understood. One senior official said:

"[Raising money] would have confused the message and taken away from the policy asks. They started to get the message across that it's not something you can solve by writing a cheque. It's about structures and governments".

However, one tabloid journalist felt that his readers still had a "*charity-giving*" approach to international development issues: "*I think that [not asking for money] confused our readers. It was saying their help was needed, but then it isn't. To be told – it's about you, but about your ability to influence governments – is still a difficult and confusing message.*"

Focus group evidence suggests that this is probably the case for much of the public, because they "*default to donating as the traditional way of alleviating global poverty*". However, during 2005 researchers noticed people developed a clearer understanding of campaigning as something distinct from donating.

A minority of interviewees from all backgrounds felt that governance and corruption could

have been included in the manifesto. However, most who mentioned it felt that it might have introduced too much complexity for a broad coalition attempting to engage a wide audience. As one senior advisor said:

“The one thing I never saw was the question – what are we asking of Africa? Asking for free access to retrovirals is fine, but how do you do that in Zimbabwe? How does an NGO operate in countries where their aid workers are arrested? But that may well have been too much of a question to ask.”

In contrast, the GCAP manifesto – which can be viewed as an evolution of the **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** manifesto – does include a fourth leg of “National Accountability” that covers these issues.

There is also a view, articulated in a recent speech by Hilary Benn, the Minister for International Development, that the UK international development community had not focused enough on economic growth. However, one senior advisor in that department clarified that this was not a criticism of the campaign’s manifesto, saying:

“I think there’s a recognition that growth is a big deal and we’ve all focused on service delivery a little to the exclusion of that. I wouldn’t say that was a criticism of 2005 at all – I would just say it’s where the discussion is headed.”

Some MPs felt that on the trade agenda, they had to explicitly clarify with coalition members that they were “*not hostile to free trade*”. These MPs felt that free trade was not explicitly a bad thing and that their understanding of trade justice could live alongside their definition of free trade. They were uncomfortable with the idea of rejecting free trade as a concept entirely.

One MP described this as “*a small concern*” saying:

“Most of the campaign had a point of view that was well-researched and thought it would be good to open markets, but that developing countries should be allowed to protect their economies. There were times when that became overly aggressive. I settled this with my constituents by agreeing that I thought “freer and fairer” trade was important.”

Two more critical views of the agenda came from a journalist and an academic. Their view was that the challenges of governance and civil society, especially in Africa, far outweigh the potential impact of the aid/debt/trade narrative. However, these critiques were not focused on the campaign in particular, rather on the role of Western development assistance in general.

Theirs was very much a minority view. The consensus among interviewees was that the

manifesto had made its case well. Many felt the Commission for Africa report in particular had provided a clear narrative for using aid, debt relief and trade justice to achieve long-term development.

It was thought to be very important that the conclusions of the Commission for Africa and the campaign's manifesto were compatible. As one peer said:

“[The campaign’s] strong messages – the one pager – are what started to get the media moving. I felt the Commission for Africa was a fantastic document and perhaps it didn’t have the impact it deserved, but it reinforced what MPH had been saying.”

3.3 The campaign’s impact as a public mobilisation

Almost unanimously, interviewees considered the great achievement of the year to be the unprecedented public and political mobilisation. As one civil servant noted:


“[The campaign] turned development into a domestic political issue. It was enormously successful at this. Only by becoming a domestic political issue can it be a long term instrument for keeping the feet of government to the fire.”

The campaign achieved huge name awareness among the general public, but more importantly, it encouraged millions of people to actually participate. This created a huge sense of ownership among sections of society not used to campaigning.

This section looks at survey data that shows the levels of public awareness and public participation. It also draws together some of the views of interviewees about the mobilisation. In particular it highlights the role of faith groups, who provided a bridge between traditional activists and the predominantly younger groups of newly engaged supporters.

Survey work conducted by Andrew Darnton for the campaign and Comic Relief gives some indication of the size and scale of the public mobilisation, as well as the speed with which it was achieved.

HEADLINE AWARENESS OF CAMPAIGN AND ISSUES
DEC 04, MAR 05 & JUL 05



By July 2005 (W3 in chart above), 87% of respondents claimed to be aware of the name “Make Poverty History” (with 76% claiming to ‘know something’ about it), compared to 30% at the start of the survey period (W1 in chart below, Dec 2004). W2 was conducted in March/April 2005.

There was also increased awareness of the coalition’s constituent messages, with a notable increase in people’s understanding of “trade justice”. By July 2005, people claiming to know something about:

- “Fair trade” rose from 68% to 74%
- “Drop the debt” rose from 43% to 54%
- “Trade justice” rose from 33% to 46%
- “More and better aid” rose from 29% to 39%

This is supported by one of the conclusions from the focus group work, which said:


“Few people know about all three objectives (debt, trade, aid) but everyone mentions at least one of them ... and trade is the issue they feel less comfortable talking about”

However, there are some caveats to this. People’s general level of concern about “levels of poverty in poor countries” stayed broadly flat throughout the year, as did people’s belief that they could personally affect change. Anecdotally, it was suggested that these survey results were affected by external factors (primarily the London bombings of July 7) and it will therefore be important to track these metrics over the long-term.

Not only was the campaign successful in terms of raising public awareness, it was also successful in encouraging the public to participate in large numbers. 15% of people surveyed in July 2005 claim to have been ‘involved’ with the campaign in some way.

PARTICIPATION IN THE CAMPAIGN

JULY 2005



There was a sense that the campaign became a genuine popular movement in 2005.

Interviewees were keen to discuss personal examples of how the campaign “*commanded the news agenda*”, especially in the first half of 2005 (particularly at the Glastonbury Festival) and in the run-up to Gleneagles. One activist said “*you got an idea of the size of it when you heard parents talking about the G8 at the school gates*”, whilst others described it as “*a Live Aid moment for the next generation*”.

One Peer commented: “*The public’s attention seems to be enormously focused on one thing that consumes everything – and it’s often just Big Brother – but in the summer, to the exception of everything else, that thing was Make Poverty History and Live8.*”

The campaign mobilised sections of the public who did not normally engage in campaigning. One MP said that campaigners “*seemed to come from all ages and social classes. It wasn’t the usual suspects*” and that this was refreshing.

This was attributed both to the communications that had been used, but also to the success of churches in mobilising their congregations.

Church and faith groups were described as “*the unsung heroes of the year*”. Faith groups had a low profile at national level, but seem to have been vital to the success of 2005 and largely under-reported. Many commented how faith groups had been successfully mobilised into lobbying MPs, attending the Edinburgh march and performing other campaign actions.

Church and faith groups can be seen as a bridge between traditional activists and the newly engaged. Traditional activists have a history of campaigning and provide much of the organisation, but exist in relatively small numbers. The newly engaged provide much of the wider interest and momentum, but are not as deeply engaged with the issues. Church groups can be seen as a bridge between the two – providing large numbers of activists and increasing the campaign’s momentum.

As one campaigner said:

“I think the churches were incredibly important in the year. You could almost see them as ‘semi-converted’ activists. The argument to them was, ‘if you really believe this stuff about injustice and poverty, then you’ve got to do something – you’ve got to get on the bus’. It was an area of natural expansion and outreach.”

Another MP pointed to the importance of the youth mobilisation:

“I think the great victory of MPH was to say to young people, idealism matters, politics is important and if you get involved, you can change the world”

The campaign was almost certainly the most significant political event among UK 16-25 year olds in 2005.

In November 2005, 1,440 16 – 25 year olds responded to an Oxfam survey on “Generation Why”. With the caveat that this is a self-selecting sample (66% of those who responded had bought a wristband), 84% said that Make Poverty History had ‘made an impression’ on them in 2005. London winning the Olympics had made an impact on 54%, and the general election made an impression on just 35%.

There was significant enthusiasm among young people for further campaigning:

- 60% said they’d like to sign a petition or send an e-mail
- 44% said they’d like to attend rallies and events
- 42% said they would like to donate money / goods
- 37% said they would like to “volunteer”

It is a challenge for coalition members to capture this enthusiasm and build a lasting relationship with young people whose first political experience was supporting the campaign. There is some evidence that this has not happened to date: 54% were not sure what was happening in 2006.

One of the aims of the evaluation was to understand public momentum and the extent to which the public were committed to further change beyond 2005. The view from the interviews is that there has been a step change in public support, but coalition members will have to work hard to sustain this momentum.

3.4 The campaign's impact as a parliamentary lobby

As a parliamentary lobby, the campaign undoubtedly dominated 2005. As a result, MPs believe that the issues supported by the coalition are now part of the mainstream of UK politics.

MPs and Peers agreed that interest in international development had been building slowly in parliament since 1997. The work of the coalition in 2005 saw this interest increase significantly.

Research done by the Charity Parliamentary Monitor in July 2005 (a survey of MPs) showed that **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** enjoyed the highest awareness, greatest support and had prompted the most activity among any campaign in their survey. The most relevant findings were that:

- 96% of MPs surveyed were “definitely aware” of the campaign
- It was the most popular campaign among MPs. 51% of MPs agreed with the statement: “I support this campaign”. The second highest response was 26% for Cancer Research UK
- 32% could recall some media/campaign activity and advertising by the coalition. The second highest response in the survey was the NSPCC at 4%
- 35% of MPs recalled receiving correspondence on behalf of the coalition. The second highest response was Climate Change at 11%
- The only question to which **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** was not the highest answer was “which charities have directly impressed you in the last 6 months”. In the July wave, the highest response was Macmillan Cancer Relief at 18%, followed by Oxfam at 15%. **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** received 14%, despite the fact that the campaign was not in fact a charity.

These survey findings are consistent with our parliamentary interviews. MPs and Peers were wholly positive about the coalition's work and impressed by the breadth of the consensus behind it. One Conservative MP remarked:

“It was probably the best campaign that I've been part of. It was informed, broad ranging and enthusiastic, well timed, well presented and well organised. I can't think of any other campaign that has been half as effective.”

One Peer noted the high levels of co-operation achieved by the agencies in parliament:

“The agencies were incredibly well co-ordinated at a parliamentary level...Whenever there was a debate about International Development, you knew that there was lots of background material available.”

One civil servant noted that “for the first time ever International Development was an election issue” and many attributed this to the work of the campaign. The Charity

Parliamentary Monitor supports this, with **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** identified as the “most impressive charity during the election campaign”.

Others pointed to the high profile given to international development and global poverty by the new Conservative leader, David Cameron. One journalist commented:

“You can see that [the Conservatives] are looking for issues that bring them closer to the mainstream of British politics. Saying that “we believe in Africa and International Development” is one of those issues and I think that’s a telling tribute to [the campaign].

Conservative MPs we interviewed – most of whom were personally already engaged with International Development issues – said that they hoped it would have been a priority in any case. The campaign had certainly raised the issue’s profile in the party. One Conservative MP also noted that on International Development “*there is now more of a consensus among the major parties than perhaps there is among the major agencies*”.

The only potential issue arising from this successful dominance of the UK political scene was that it did not reflect the reality of where the policy competence actually lay, especially on trade issues. This was the view of a minister, who described the challenge faced by the members of the coalition:

“I think the coalition has the capacity to remain influential with British governments of whatever hue, but in a globalised world this is not enough. The question is how you have a global campaign to address global poverty?”

One MP said, “*I think the battle for the ear of UK politicians has been won*”, whilst another said “*You need to push at the roadblocks: these are in the EU, the WTO and the G8 rather than in parliament.*”

The campaign clearly achieved less purchase with international governments than it did with the UK government. The effectiveness of the campaign as an international lobby is covered in more detail in Section 3.7.7, whilst potential next steps are covered in Section 7.

3.5 The campaign's impact on policy

3.5.1 Summary

This section looks at what senior decision makers and commentators believe the campaign achieved in terms of policy change. It covers their views on what was achieved in total, as well as considering what was achieved in each of the key policy areas of aid, debt and trade. For comparative purposes, this section also incorporates sections of the final verdict statements issued by the campaign. These are highlighted in grey boxes. The full verdict statement is available in the appendix.

The questions of *why* and *how* these commitments were secured are addressed in section 3.6.

3.5.2 Overview of policy achievements

The campaign's verdict statement divided its views on policy change into UK and International policy change. The summary of achievements was given as:

INTERNATIONAL POLICY CHANGE

The incredible level of public commitment and face-to-face lobbying was undoubtedly influential in ensuring global poverty was placed higher on the national and global agenda than ever before.

Important progress was made through the G8 in securing promises of extra financial resources for developing countries in the form of extra aid and the proposed deeper debt cancellation for some poor countries. In addition, several rich countries promised to meet more ambitious aid targets further in the future. Importantly, three crucial international principles were established at key international forums:

- The international acceptance of the principle of 100% multilateral debt cancellation.
- The undertaking at the G8 summit that developing countries have the right to “decide, plan and sequence their economic policies to fit with their own development strategies.”
- Support for as close as possible to universal access to treatment for HIV and AIDS for all who need it by 2010.

These principles provide important levers for campaigning in the future, though they do not yet live up to the scale of the challenge set by campaigners.

UK POLICY CHANGE

In terms of UK policy change, a number of important new changes in approach were established and campaigners are now looking for urgent evidence of them being turned into practical action:

- The UK Government's recognition that donors' imposition of economic policies on developing countries is inappropriate and ineffective for poverty eradication.
- The commitment to no longer make UK bilateral aid conditional on recipient governments making specific economic policy decisions.
- The promise to make UK aid more predictable so action against poverty can be more effective.
- The UK Government and Labour manifesto statements that poor countries should not be forced to open their markets and provide assurances that this is a priority approach in regional and multilateral trade negotiations.
- The UK demonstrated a shift in its support for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria by doubling its contribution to the Fund from the previous year.

Most interviewees from within government believe that in policy terms, the campaign made a real contribution over the year. One senior government advisor said:

“Let’s be clear, MPH was hugely successful. We never would have got everything we got at Gleneagles if it wasn’t for the public pressure and the lobbying work done by the coalition.”

This view was echoed by a journalist, who said:

“It was undoubtedly a success. The G8 pushed further down the road than they would have without it. The fact that they didn’t go all the way is no reason to give up. They moved a long way along their agenda.”

In terms of overall policy asks there was a wide consensus that the campaign could point to a number of victories, but that far more had been achieved on aid and debt than on trade.

Whilst progress on the specific policy areas is outlined below, many interviewees, without prompting, chose to score progress out of 10. On debt and aid, those who offered a view tended to score progress as around 6 and 7 out of 10, with one senior government advisor scoring aid as low as 4. Aid tended to get a higher score than debt. These scores tended to come with the caveat that they all depended on implementation of the commitments made at Gleneagles.

However, on trade it was thought that much less had been achieved. The most optimistic people within government scored progress as no higher than 3 out of 10. Interviewees identified multiple reasons why the coalition was less effective at securing progress on trade. The challenges of the trade agenda are described in more detail in section 7.

3.5.3 Policy change on More and Better Aid

The coalition’s official verdict on More and Better Aid was:

MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY called for donors to immediately deliver at least \$50 billion more in aid per year and set a binding timetable for spending 0.7% of national income on aid. Aid must also be made to work more effectively for poor people.

The 2005 G8 summit signalled an extra \$48 billion a year by 2010, which included between \$15 and \$20 billion of new commitments. If this promise is kept and delivered without imposing economic conditions, millions of lives could be saved. This will be a lasting legacy of 2005. However, the aid pledges made this year are not on the scale needed to make poverty history. The rate of progress towards the long overdue target of 0.7% is still far too slow.

Fifteen members of the EU have set themselves the goal of spending 0.56% of GDP on world development aid by 2010, and reaching the UN target of a minimum of 0.7% of GDP by 2015. This will mean increasing public development aid by more than €20 billion over the next five years. The EU commitment to reaching 0.7% by 2015 is encouraging but individual Member States must now ensure they fully deliver on their pledges and do not backtrack on their commitments.

On the call to ensure better quality and more effective aid some limited progress was made. G8 countries recognised that developing countries have the right to decide their own economic policies, although they failed to translate this into concrete changes in the conditions attached to aid. Donors agreed to be monitored on targets to ensure that aid is better aligned to needs and priorities, more focused on poverty reduction, is more coordinated and reduces the reporting burden.

Furthermore, Africa has been identified as a priority for Europe. The European Commission has called for the formulation of a European response to the continent's problems encompassing issues such as the quality and quantity of aid, elements of good governance, infrastructure, etc. Half of the increase in aid that EU Member States have agreed to (up from €46 billion in 2006 to €66 billion in 2010) will go to Africa. However, the targets and indicators fall short of campaign demands, especially on the crucial area of untying all the aid to all developing countries.

There was consensus that the major policy achievement of the year was the commitment to increase aid volumes. As one academic said:

“On the whole I think it was a remarkable result. Doha and HK are unfinished business and there wasn't much progress on the Millennium goals, but the big result was the commitment to double aid, from bubbling along at \$56bn to reaching \$130bn over time. That's a big achievement.”

There was also felt to be good progress on the “more and better aid” agenda. One journalist said “On aid, I don't think even the most optimistic agency was expecting what they got on aid outcomes” whilst a European campaigner said “On aid, there were good pledges on quantity and effectiveness.”

Special advisors in different departments gave credit to the campaign for keeping the pressure on the UK government to deliver a timetable for 0.7%. One said:

“Would the government have done a timetable for 0.7% without the pressure from MPH? I don't think so. I'm not sure that is something we would have offered up.”

Although another advisor identified 2004 as the critical moment for lobbying the UK government on the timetable:

“In 2004, they pushed the government to do a 0.7% timetable. That was something the government didn't want to do. This was more about good advocacy than activism and a knowledge of how and where to apply pressure in government. – especially from Oxfam. The fact that they were coming together in 2005 as a big campaign created the space for them to apply this pressure.”

In terms of international progress on aid, one academic suggested that the EU ministerial was more important than Gleneagles:

“The major announcement wasn’t the G8, but the meeting of EU ministers in May on aid. Delivering more aid was about an international consensus. How did the British government get movement in Germany and Italy?”

This view is the basis for some comments that the aid commitments at Gleneagles were not “new money”. But a senior advisor close to the G8 talks claimed that the deal was not done until the last days of Gleneagles and that the European partners, especially those making the biggest commitments, still needed convincing up until the last minute:

“A small part of the aid deal would have happened anyway, but lots of it was new. But the point of the G8 was locking it down, turning promises into reality. The resistance from the other countries [during the negotiations] proved that it was a real promise”.

3.5.4 Policy change on Debt

The campaign’s official verdict statement on debt was:

MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY called for the unpayable debts of the world’s poorest countries to be cancelled in full, by fair and transparent means.

The G8’s debt deal, which has still to be finally agreed by the IMF and World Bank, should be worth up to \$1billion per year for the 18 countries that qualify (around 20 more could also become eligible). This compares to the minimum of \$10 billion debt cancellation per year needed to help developing countries achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

The deal made by Nigeria’s creditors to cancel roughly two thirds (\$18billion) of its debt was a welcome addition to the package of debt cancellation this year. We do not support some aspects of this deal; for example Nigeria, in spite of its huge poverty needs, will be required to make a large upfront payment of \$12.4 billion. We hope creditors will return this money immediately for the benefit of people who are poor.

The principle of cancelling 100 per cent of the debt owed to multilateral institutions and recognising that debt relief must extend further than the current list of eligible countries are important breakthroughs but major issues remain unresolved. Most indebted developing countries still do not qualify for debt relief and the debts owed to other creditors such as the Inter American Development Bank have not been cancelled. Damaging economic policy conditions remain attached to financing debt relief and there is still no fair and transparent arbitration mechanism for resolving debt crises.

On debt, most people in government think there was good progress, whilst even some of the more critical academics and journalists give credit for the progress that was made.

One of the Live8 organisers was upbeat about the Gleneagles progress on the debt programme.

“No-one said 18 months ago that we’d get debt cancellation and use the word cancellation, with no conditionality. That was a real result. Of course we’d have wanted more countries included, but it was real progress.”

Even one of the more critical European NGOs felt the G8 pledges were good.

“On debt there were some reasonable pledges at the G8, but it can always fall foul of the hoops and loops”

However, some within government think that campaign was not asking for anything that was not already on the government’s agenda. The view of one special advisor was:

“On aid and debt, to be honest, there wasn’t that much between us. They were issues where we occupied the same policy space.”

The example given to support this was Gordon Brown’s recent comment that the G8 should provide *“full debt relief for not 38 but all the world’s poorest countries”*. (Guardian, January 11, 2006).

Within the G8, UK policymakers believe there is now an international consensus around the idea of debt relief, although there is still disagreement about the speed and progress of implementation. One MP said:

“I think there’s no doubt that the argument on debt relief, that’s it’s important when accompanied by actions which make a difference, has been won.”

A number of members of the government identified the Jubilee Debt Campaign as particularly effective in its international mobilisation. One government advisor said:

“Some of the activism and advocacy on debt in other countries was effective. I would say that JDC - rather than MPH - had lots of people who had international contacts and understood the issues. [In contrast] in the UK, there was less progress in the year because the government was already ahead of the curve.”

The main concern on debt was that the issue was no longer as important as its campaigning profile deserved. One European advisor commented:

“Debt is no doubt a totemic issue, but in terms of total flows, I don’t think it’s as important as other campaignable issues”

A senior official reinforced this view:

“Debt is just part of aid. Debt and aid provide the resources to help countries out of poverty. However, debt is overdone as an issue – it’s wonderfully campaignable, but the amounts involved have relatively little impact”

The same official also noted that if the message got out that “all debt is bad” then that could

be dangerous for development, as it was critical for the capital investment that allowed people to increase their incomes.

3.5.5 Policy change on Trade

The campaign's official verdict on trade was:

MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY called for:

- Action to ensure that governments, particularly in poor countries, can choose the best solutions to end poverty and protect the environment.
- An end to the export and other subsidies that damage the livelihoods of poor rural communities around the world.
- Laws that stop big business profiting at the expense of people and the environment.

In 2005 the UK Government changed the language it uses on trade justice including positive statements on reducing European agricultural subsidies, a changed policy position on trade related conditionality (the strings attached to financing) and important new statements on stopping forced liberalisation. Campaigners looked to December's World Trade Organisation (WTO) Ministerial for urgent evidence of their implementation, particularly around stopping forced liberalisation.

However, despite having the ability to correct some of the gross imbalances in world trade, rich countries at the WTO, including those of the UK Government and its European Union (EU) partners, favoured their own interests over the world's poor. The approaches of some, particularly the EU and United States (US), showed no respect for the poor countries whose demands and concerns were repeatedly sidelined.

In WTO services negotiations, the UK Government verbally committed to opposing mandatory approaches. Yet in direct opposition to developing countries, the EU continued to demand mandatory targets for the liberalisation of trade in services. This means poor countries will be pushed into negotiations that could see essential services such as water, health and education opened up to foreign competition.

Major developed countries failed to end the dumping of agricultural products in developing countries. The fact that the EU and the US are retaining the domestic agricultural subsidies that continue to damage poor and vulnerable farmers in developing countries, renders the agreed 2013 date for ending export subsidies an empty gesture. These subsidies account for only a small proportion of current agricultural support – less than 5% in the case of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy – and would in any case have been scaled down to almost nothing by 2013. Until the dumping of all subsidised crops and products on poor countries' markets is ended, small-scale farmers face worsening poverty. There was however progress in this area, special measures to protect vulnerable farmers in poor countries from liberalisation based on criteria such as food security, livelihood security and rural development, something trade justice campaigners have been calling for.

In manufacturing and industrial trade, the WTO introduced the most extreme method of cutting tariffs. These tariffs enable poor countries to stop the flood of industrial goods which can destroy local businesses. Unfair competition from rich countries' multinational corporations also raises the threat of massive job losses and lost revenue to poor country governments.

Urgent changes are still needed if developing countries are to protect and cultivate their economies. As the WTO reconvenes at its headquarters in Geneva, campaigners will continue to press the UK Government for urgent action within the EU to deliver on its promise of no forced liberalisation. Two thirds of global trade is carried out by multinationals and, outside of trade talks, a key demand was for the UK Government to regulate companies. As it stands, the Company Law Reform Bill will not provide a legal framework to ensure that UK companies do not pursue profits at the expense of workers' rights, human rights and environmental sustainability. Provisions requiring companies to report on their social and environmental impacts have been removed from the bill. No meaningful steps been taken to prevent trade rules undermining core labour standards. Campaigners are organising to insist these happen.

All interviewees agreed that there was little progress on the trade agenda. One special advisor said *“frankly, [the UK government] wouldn’t complain at all about being criticised on trade”*.

People also agreed that although it was the area where the least progress was made, it was the most important of the three issues when it came to addressing global poverty in the long-term.

It was felt that the trade campaign had some impact, as it had changed the views of the UK government and senior figures in DG Trade on some issues, particularly around mandatory targets for services liberalisation. One senior advisor said:

“The Trade Justice Movement was effective at changing some of the rhetoric on forced liberalisation, and the UK’s policy position changed, but there was no change in EU policy and no change in practice”.

An advisor with the European Commission said that DG Trade had *“absorbed a lot of the UK NGO view on trade and development”* though in practice there had been little institutional change.

In comparison to debt relief, where people felt there was now an international consensus, there is no similar consensus around the interdependence of trade and development. In fact, it was felt that the level of the debate in the UK might have raised expectations about what was possible internationally. One journalist commented:

“People forget that in the UK, there is a pretty sophisticated policy debate about trade and international development that isn’t replicated in other countries.”

Therefore, what might appear a more modest victory – linking the ideas of trade and development – was a necessary first step towards building that consensus. As one of the advisors at DG Trade said:

“In terms of the general message – raising awareness that trade and development were part of the same agenda – then the campaign was successful. In Europe, you have to realise that is where you need to start from. The French sincerely believe that they are generous in their aid, that their preferences help the poorest and that CAP reform is about opening up the EU to American-owned agribusiness. They don’t really think trade is anything to do with development. This is the consensus and it has to be shifted, not confronted”.

There was a consensus that trade was never on the agenda at Gleneagles and that the proper forums for those discussions were the EU and WTO.

In addition to the more challenging campaigning environment, the coalition's policy asks on trade were considered less coherent than their positions on debt and aid. Given the breadth of the coalition, as well as the complexity and interdependence of trade outcomes, it was felt that this was somewhat inevitable. As one MP said:

“Beyond a few simple ideas, something like trade is an incredibly complex issue and it's always going to be hard to hold together an umbrella group on these issues.”

Officials who were involved in trade negotiations felt that the coalition could have done more to prioritise its policy asks. One said:

“On trade, [the coalition's] coherence came from what they were against, rather than what they were for. So it was a bit of a laundry list of requests. The problem with this approach is that when we said, “You never get everything you want when you go to the EU, so what on the list is most important?” they couldn't get to an answer other than saying “all of it”. Obviously it would have been better if they could have agreed their priorities together.”

As a result some interviewees felt that the issues identified by the coalition on trade were not those that were considered most important to development, but “the lowest common denominator stuff that everyone could agree upon”.

As one advisor in DG Trade said “A lot of the criticisms around forced liberalisation were basically a critique of the Washington Consensus – but they aren't criticisms of the EU, because we would broadly accept those views on conditionalities.” Similarly, the focus on export subsidies was felt to be greater than the impact it deserved because “the big reform of export subsidies has been done. It's being phased out by 2013 and bringing it forward to 2010 would not have been a massive victory for the poor compared to the other targets out there.”

As trade is the most important issue in the long run, the most difficult issue to campaign upon and the area of least progress in 2005, then taking the debate forward in this area must be a priority for the members of the coalition. To provide a framework for this debate, the challenges faced on the trade issue are described more fully in Section 7.

3.5.6 Policy change on HIV/AIDS

The official verdict statement on HIV/AIDS was:

MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY called for commitment to universal access to HIV & AIDS treatment by 2010 and replenishment of the Global Fund for HIV, TB and Malaria.

The G8's commitment to access to HIV treatment was the clearest success of the campaign, a significant and important policy shift to commit to “as close as possible to universal access to treatment for all those who need it by 2010”. The target was endorsed at the UN World Summit and became an international commitment.

However, the concerns that the target would be undermined by the insufficient new aid announced at Gleneagles were proved right in September when the final pledges to replenishment of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria fell drastically short of the \$7billion it needed. This puts expansion of the Fund in jeopardy.

Whilst WHO and UNAIDS are taking forward the planning for meeting the target, campaigners will be watching to make sure the G8 do not forget the commitment they made. Achieving this target will require advances in UK policy and practice to generate increased resources, make drugs affordable and accessible and strengthen health systems.

The issues on the health agenda – particularly around HIV/AIDS and Malaria – were not identified as central issues for the campaign.

Although they were part of the government's agenda at Gleneagles, formed a key part of the Commission for Africa and appeared in the campaign manifesto, they were not perceived as core to the campaign in the same way as aid, debt and trade.

As a consequence, although some people commented that the coalition's work on World Aids Day was "*particularly good*" in the way that they were engaged with government, it was not considered a high priority.

3.6 Reasons for the coalition's overall impact

3.6.1 Summary

This section looks at those activities pursued by the coalition that created the public mobilisation, political pressure and policy change of 2005.

Whilst it is hard to draw direct causal relationships between actions and outcomes, there was a broad consensus among the interviewees about what the coalition had done well and the actions that had the largest impact on decision-making.

The reason for the effectiveness of the coalition was felt to be the combination of:

- The fact that coalition members committed to work together
- The popular communications. This includes the brand, the portfolio of tools, media coverage, celebrity support, Live8 and the Edinburgh rally
- The policy research that supported the communications

Before looking at each of these activities, it is important to acknowledge the special conditions that provided the “campaigning hooks”, the agenda and the particular receptiveness of the government to lobbying on this agenda in 2005.

3.6.2 2005: Unique conditions for development campaigning

In 2005, the coalition operated in a political and intellectual environment that was particularly receptive to development campaigning. One academic described the following model for political change:

“To get policy change, you need three things: Political leadership; pressure from civil society and the power of a good idea. This year saw advances in all three areas.”

Using this model, “political leadership” and “the power of a good idea” need to be understood to provide context for the coalition's achievements in 2005.

Senior members of the government were keen to stress the levels of “*political capital that had been invested*” in the development agenda by the UK Government, especially when “*there are no votes in international development*”. For example, during the G8 negotiations, it was felt that the UK had “*kept the bar raised high*” in a forum that usually preferred diluted, lowest common denominator agreements.

Whilst one might expect members of the government to emphasise the role played by the government, even outsiders acknowledged this had been important. As one academic said, “*In the UK, there was genuine political leadership. Who knows why, but Blair and Brown are really committed to this and they put in lots of heavy lifting in the G8, EU and other forums.*”

There was also a clear willingness on the part of the government to be lobbied by the coalition. A number of MPs talked about the way the campaign had “*created the space for*

policymakers to work in”, whilst a journalist said:

“If you asked politicians like Gordon Brown what they would most like, they would say a Make Poverty History for Child Poverty in the UK. They see campaigns like this as an effective way of holding policymakers to account and making people do things they don’t want to do”.

There were many views about why the government was so engaged with this issue. Some, especially from within government, noted the personal commitment shown to global poverty by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair and the Chancellor, Gordon Brown. Others, more typically outside government, mentioned Iraq and the election as motivating factors. Many noted that 2005 was the culmination of a long period of sustained advocacy on the part of the leading NGOs. However, as one senior advisor said:

“Everyone’s got their own history, but it was always clear that 2005 was going to be a massive moment for development.”

Some commentators questioned whether the relationship between the campaign and the government was too close. This issue is covered in more detail in Section 3.7.5.

On the “the power of a good idea”, interviewees suggested that the campaign built on work done by others over the last five years. The Jubilee Debt Campaign, Jeffrey Sachs and the Millennium Development Goals were most frequently cited.

In addition to the intellectual framework, there were multiple campaigning ‘hooks’ for the development agenda. Interviewees identified “a structured set of focal points for campaigners” including the various meetings at Gleneagles, Cancun, Monterrey, Hong Kong and Johannesburg.

Many people noted that these hooks do not exist in the future. In 2005, they provided focus, natural deadlines and opportunities for advocacy. As a consequence, it might be harder to replicate the achievements of the year.

Most people interviewed felt that the intellectual and political consensus was a British rather than an international phenomenon. The challenge for people campaigning about global poverty is to globalise their efforts and work towards an international political and policy consensus.

This is a clear next step for the coalition members and is outlined in more detail in Section 7.

3.6.3 The coherence and unity of the organisation

The very existence of a wide-ranging coalition was thought to be central to its effectiveness. The group gained “a lot of credibility from all the groups in the country that were part of a wider coalition” according to a minister, whilst a peer said:

“It was incredibly impressive to see all those groups set [their own agendas] to one side, subsume their personalities and work together under a single banner. This obviously took a great deal of work, but it was what made it incredibly effective.”

The breadth of the campaign generated a powerful consensus. According to one journalist:

“Apart from a few contrarians, there was a huge consensus behind it. The three main parties, the hundreds of organisations involved and the millions of people. For people who’ve been long-term activists, you have to think back twenty years to recognise the significance of it.”

Not only did this breadth of approach impress decision-makers, it has also inspired coalitions around the world. The perspective from a GCAP spokesman was that:

“[The campaign] is a model for a civil society organisation, especially in terms of the breadth of the constituency it has brought together. Many of the coalitions in other countries have been inspired by this model.”

3.6.4 The campaign communications

When looking at the work of the coalition over the year, interviewees were most impressed with the way the coalition harnessed popular, mass-market communications to mobilise large sections of the public.

Not only was this considered a success, it was considered to be genuinely innovative.

Interviewees believe that the large public mobilisation had the greatest impact on politicians and decision-makers. As one senior advisor said:

“It was the click ad, the celebrities, the wristbands – all that very popular stuff. That’s what frightened the politicians.”

Whilst another advisor claimed that popular campaigns were now more effective than traditional activism, saying that:

“If 100,000 people write in, that does have an impact. But in reality, press and parliament are more effective at getting the attention of ministers.”

The most effective elements of the communications work were felt to be:

- A strong brand and a clear message based on solid policy research
- The wide range of marketing and communications activities that used this message
- The use of celebrity endorsement
- The breadth of media coverage

- Live8 and the Edinburgh rally

3.6.5 The brand and message

Interviewees felt that the brand and message of the coalition had been great strengths. As one journalist commented:

“Make Poverty History is a phenomenally powerful brand – it has become part of the argot of politics. The strength of the brand tended to override any problems there might have been”

Whilst a Minister said:

“The coalition was a spectacular brand, that allowed the organisations to leverage their particular skills – be that their policy expertise or their memberships. It cut through the cacophony of noise that you could otherwise get from such a diverse range of groups.”

Whilst people were most impressed by the scale of the public mobilisation, most felt that this was based on foundations of solid policy analysis. As one journalist said:

“You couldn’t have had the public consensus without the policy analysis. You needed the weight of the analysis to make the slogans work”

It was thought that this combination of factors – a strong slogan, underpinned by a strong policy-led consensus, had been particularly effective. As one senior advisor said:

“The most effective thing they did was put together a clear message, applicable to a wide range of audiences, that could be overlaid with more sophistication and detail. Then they consistently repeated it. [Our department] tends to be pretty bad at getting our message out, so it was good to see them doing it so consistently.”

The “call to action” in the message was thought to be particularly important. As one MP said:

“The campaign was successful because it articulated that there was a problem, a solution and that lining up behind that solution was the right thing to do.”

A minority of interviewees, largely outside government, felt that the messages that were used to mobilise the public were “too simplistic”. As one official said:

“I think there is a question about what it means in practice. I think a lot of people are aware that there is an issue, but have only the fuzziest idea what ‘fairer trade’ actually means.”

Whilst this view is certainly supported by survey and focus group evidence, the consensus of the interviewees was that this was not a criticism of the campaign. In fact, the majority were positive about how the campaign had substance underneath their headlines. The challenge for the campaign is to take those who have engaged with the simple messages to go on a journey and engage with more of the detail.

The view was echoed by a Peer, who said:

“To anyone who thinks that [the messages were too simplistic], they should have a go at running a popular campaign. They wouldn’t get in the paper, let alone on the front page. Things had to be clear, simple and accessible. The choice isn’t between simple and complex messages. It’s between simple or nothing.”

Some felt that when the coalition got into detail, some of this clarity had been lost (particularly around trade and particularly in the later parts of 2005). However, in general people felt that the message had been well communicated.

3.6.6 The portfolio of marketing and communications activities

The coalition gained credit for developing a strong brand with clear messages. The innovation was the variety and creativity with which this message was used.

As one person closely involved with the popular communications said:

“There were a handful of nuggets that from a creative and communications point of view you could really work with. Things like the date of the G8, the fact that it was justice not charity, the fact that someone dies every 3 seconds. This gave us some incredibly powerful stuff to work with. We acted to deliverables and deadlines and the attitude was, unless you’ve got a better idea, we’re doing it. As a consequence, in the first few months, it was brilliant.”

The result of this was a series of mass-market communications that interviewees felt had captured the public’s imagination. A senior government advisor’s view was:

“Given the size of what they wanted to do. It was clear that they needed a sophisticated strategy – and to do things differently from what had gone before ...I think a lot of what really worked were those things that came from Richard Curtis and Comic Relief. They really engaged the public.”

Some members of government noted that there had been some resistance to this popular approach by members of the coalition who were more focused on traditional approaches to activism, but felt that in terms of achieving outcomes, these methods had proved their worth.

For example, people were positive about the wristbands, especially as a tool for engaging young people. As one politician said:

“The wristbands were key to the involvement of kids – they started to ask, why can’t we do something? Why can’t we get involved? It’s an important group that’s often ignored”

Others pointed to the new media work. This was important for both ends of the activist spectrum. Young campaigners look to the Internet by default and there was a wealth of material available as well as the ability to sign up and campaign online. More experienced campaigners talked about the Internet as a resource for research materials and as a tool for organising and co-ordinating offline campaign actions.

The new media evaluation underway should provide more insight into the effect of the campaign’s online activities. However, anecdotal evidence from GCAP suggests that interest in the websites of other coalitions around the world was triggered by Live8 and that this kick-started campaigning in those countries.

Some wondered whether the coalition members had the capacity and skills for this sort of communications work in the future. It is also a question to what extent these skills were represented within the campaign’s management structure. One of the people involved with the communications said:

“Communicating with a broad public audience is very tough. You need stubborn, experienced populists. In the future, it will be very important to sort out who plays that role.”

One of the strengths of the coalition was that it allowed people to run their own events under the **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** brand. However, it is beyond the scope of this evaluation to document every single instance of campaign activity.

When pressed for examples of the good communications, interviewees tended to concentrate on the ways in which the brand was used centrally. The activities most frequently cited as influential were:

- The White Bands
- The use of celebrities
- The ‘Click’ ads
- Nelson Mandela event in Trafalgar Square
- The television specials (Vicar of Dibley, Girl in the Café)
- Advertising around the G8
- The use of new media

- The major events: Live8, the Edinburgh March and the Trade Justice Lobby

Given the size and scale of the coalition, this is far from an exhaustive list of what happened in 2005. Most obviously it leaves out the local activity. Around the country, churches were wrapped in White Bands, petitions were raised, letters were written, schools ran events and local groups were set up.

The work of the local groups is addressed in Section 4.

3.6.7 The use of celebrity support

Celebrity support was felt to be a necessary element of any modern campaign. The two reasons for this were political influence and achieving the media coverage needed to reach a mass-market audience.

Most people took a pragmatic view of this. As one journalist said:

“You would never say, let’s set up a world that puts power and access in the hands of unelected celebrities. Of course it’s wrong, of course it’s nuts. But that’s the way it is, so let’s try and make it work”

Another journalist said *“the celebrity thing wouldn’t have worked 20 years ago, but now you need to go down that route if you want to get attention”* adding *“I read somewhere that charities are thinking of scaling back on their use of celebrities. That’s fine if they only want to get coverage in the broadsheets, but I think it would be a massive mistake to turn their backs on it.”*

One EU advisor felt that celebrity was more salient among EU leaders than in the US, commenting that:

“Having Geldof and Bono involved was very important, because political leaders don’t want to upset them. Someone like Barroso is committed to Africa, but he certainly wants to be on the right side of these people.”

It was thought that the campaign’s use of celebrity had been *“tastefully done”* and largely successful. An MP said *“Someone like Chris Martin of Coldplay has done a lot to communicate an overview on something like fair trade and then he’s been well backed up with a lot of detailed work by the agencies”*.

3.6.8 A sophisticated approach to media coverage

The press coverage achieved by the coalition, especially in the first half of the year, was thought to be very impressive and critical to building the public momentum. One MP said:

“They targeted the media very well. They got to all the right places.”

Interviewees felt that key members of the coalition had a sophisticated approach to dealing with the media. One journalist said:

“The media wants to be spoon-fed. [Parts of the coalition] were geared to be reactive. They understood our needs. That comes from a lifetime of dealing with tabloids.”

One journalist used the example of the letter from Nelson Mandela that appeared in his newspaper as an example of this sophistication.

“They came to us with a letter from Mandela. We wouldn’t have thought of that, but not just that – we don’t have that sort of access. But they had taken it on to the next level – they had the letter written and brought it to us. Of course we were going to run with it”.

Journalists made the point that although some of the messages could be dismissed as irrelevant or simplistic, the breadth of coverage contributed to the momentum and public awareness. Journalists feel that the simple, popular messages engaged large numbers of people, created the space for the more sophisticated messages and increased the likelihood of public participation. As one journalist said:

“Some of the stuff they did you might consider frivolous, but it all contributed to the momentum. The eBay story [about Live8 tickets], the wristbands, the free tickets – it was all page one stuff. There was a real sense of a countdown.”

One of the people closely involved with the press campaign said that finding hooks for stories was an explicit aim of their activity, saying:

“The trick is to find the corollary. You have to make every story about Africa, about poverty, have an MPH angle. For example, the Mirror always run a story about their village in Africa. This year, that became an MPH story.”

The only criticism of the approach to the media came from a journalist who thought that there were a number of “long-term Africa specialists” in the UK media who had not been targeted effectively by the coalition.

3.6.9 The impact of Live8 and the Edinburgh rally

MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY was considered very successful at applying political pressure via the mobilisation of the public. It was not felt that the campaign applied the same pressure internationally. However, interviewees believed that Live8 played this role effectively. As one MP said:

“The British campaign started the momentum, so policymakers could communicate to foreign officials the pressure they were under and the level of support on this issue. Then Live8 was great at making foreign officials feel the pressure themselves.”

A number of academics and journalists were sceptical about the impact of Live8, with one saying *“I can’t believe that Live8 had that much influence in the G8”*. This view has also been widely reported in the press.

But senior advisors close to the G8 negotiations thought that the impact of Live8 was critical. As one senior advisor said:

“In terms of moving the G8 negotiations, Live8 really frightened them. It was massive in Germany and Japan. MPH alone, as a traditional campaign, wouldn’t have had that impact.”

According to the evaluation of the Edinburgh march, over a quarter of a million people attended, compared with expectations of 100,000. The event was commended as an especially family friendly event and for many activists it represented the pinnacle of all their work in the year.

The Edinburgh march was thought to be an *“amazing”* event for those who attended and was felt to have galvanised many activists who had been working on the campaign throughout the year. According to the event evaluation, it met or exceeded the expectations of a majority of participants. Over 70% of attendees surveyed were more likely to campaign in the future and over 50% were more likely to donate to **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY**.

However, among those interviewed, there was a consensus that whilst the rally had been successful at mobilising and galvanising activists, it had been less effective than Live8 at applying pressure on the other G8 leaders.

The reason for this is primarily one of scale and media interest. As one of the main organisers of the communications work said:

“The problem with a march, any march, is that it might always end up as second item on the news after Jordan’s baby.”

In contrast, the unique nature and enormous scale of Live8 was guaranteed to attract media, public and political attention. As one of the Live8 organisers said:

“What brings heat? Heat is hundreds of thousands of people. The Americans don’t consider 10,000 U2 fans a night to be political pressure. So Live8 had to be huge. We went to Italy, France and Germany and got the media all excited. The media got the bands interested and once it’s moving you have the chance to start talking about the issues.”

The media also showed far more interest in Live8 than the march. A journalist said that they need to have *“ownership of Live8 in a way we wouldn’t have felt about the march on it’s own. Live8 was always on page one. It had momentum.”*

Comparison of media coverage by the Edinburgh event evaluators shows that whilst coverage and interest in the Edinburgh march was high, coverage of Live8 was higher. For example, in the two days after 2nd July, the rally received 23 headline and lead paragraph mentions in national publications. This number goes up to 51 when stories about Live8 are included. The evaluation did not count stories where Live8 was mentioned, but not the rally.

Interviewees consistently said there was no use *“blaming the media”* for choosing to cover one event instead of another. Rather it should be accepted as a fact of life, like the use of celebrities. Campaigners who are focused on outcomes should think about how they can use these tools to their ends rather than dismissing them.

This case does not seem to have been won internationally, according to a GCAP spokesman. Activists in coalition in other countries prefer to *“spend their time and money on long-term grassroots activism”* because they are sceptical about the impact, cost and short-term nature of an event like Live8 as a campaigning tool. However, if these methods are shown to work and are to have an impact on policymakers, then *“they will be more likely to embrace them”*.

3.7 Other external perspectives

This section provides an external perspective on other issues raised by interviewees and commentators in the media. It covers four main themes:

- The impact of the **leadership model**. Whilst this was felt to be vital to holding the coalition together, it led to slow and reactive decision-making
- The challenge of **co-ordinating responses** in a broad coalition. This was difficult because of the lack of a central spokesperson and differences within the coalition on how to best communicate progress and work with government
- The levels of **sustainable public momentum** and the work needed to maintain these levels of interest
- The extent to which the coalition was seen as a **British campaign**, rather than an international campaign

3.7.1 The leadership model

The coalition was organised with an innovative leadership model that was explicitly “facilitative” and had no central secretariat. Many who knew about the leadership model compared it to the more “*traditional secretariat and spokesman*” structure of the Jubilee Debt Campaign.

One member of the government said that they should have chosen the Jubilee model, because the structure they selected led to “*decision-making [that] was consistently slow and defaulted to the lowest common denominator*”. There was a clear example of this in the eyes of one journalist:

“It doesn’t reflect well on the NGOs that the G8 – with all that diversity and national interest - could agree and sign a common text, and in the next room the NGOs couldn’t do the same thing”

Whilst there was in fact a formal campaign text, external interviewees were largely unaware of it. Those who were aware of the common text considered it less relevant than the fact that there had not been a common response from campaign members, international campaigners and other non-governmental actors at the time.

One journalist noted that a traditional leadership approach might not have worked for the campaign, due to the breadth of the coalition. He felt the structure it had adopted was right one, because “*Jubilee 2000 was easier. It was a single-issue campaign. MPH was a much broader canvas, so everyone needed to make compromises*”.

The fact that the structure allowed the coalition to hold together over the year was seen from the outside as the model’s great strength.

The fundamental unity of the coalition meant that internal debates never became the focus of the media. One journalist said, “*The internal stuff never became the story because it was People’s Front of Judea stuff...if someone had left that would have been news.*”

The downside to a facilitative model, according to another journalist was that *“it was never really clear who was running it”* whilst a senior advisor said *“the leadership, such as it was, didn’t seem to lead in the traditional sense.”*

Some suggested that there was not enough involvement from senior managers of the agencies at key moments when *“some of the cracks had started to appear”*.

However, many were surprised at the degree of discipline shown by the coalition, with one advisor saying:

“There was quite a degree of discipline in the coalition and I was pleasantly surprised by that. We expected them to be more divergent than they actually were.”

3.7.2 The challenge of co-ordinating responses

Whilst most interviewees praised the mass communications and the co-ordination of lobbying efforts in the first half of the year, interviewees pointed to a number of examples where the co-ordination of policy responses from different agencies had not been well managed. This was a clear consensus from those in government, journalists and MPs in all parties.

Three things were felt to have contributed to this difficulty in co-ordinating responses:

- The lack of a central spokesperson
- A lack of a general consensus about communicating progress
- A lack of consensus about how campaigns should engage with government

Many interviewed were sympathetic to the structural difficulties of co-ordinating communications in this environment. As one special advisor said:

“It was perhaps an inevitable difficulty of such a broad and loose coalition that its member’s weren’t bound by any sense of collective responsibility”

The most obvious consequence of this difficulty was that the post-G8 response was not well handled. Interviewees felt that most within the coalition had acknowledged this and as a consequence, the end of year verdict statements had been much better.

3.7.3 Central spokesperson

The lack of central spokesperson meant that according to one journalist *“different agencies were trying to be the authentic voice of the coalition”*. This created a situation where every agency felt they were holding true to the principles of the coalition, but sending out different and potentially conflicting messages.

One journalist had a similar view expressed in critical terms:

“The downside of the coalition was that it was easy for organisations to capture the platform. There was no central leadership that anyone felt bound by, or that could respond to that. So it gave extra credibility to smaller groups who didn’t represent the majority opinion and who could be very shrill.”

Many said that Bob Geldof was seen by members of the public as the de facto spokesman of the coalition because, as one Live8 organiser said, there was no one for the “cameras to point at – and they had to point at someone”.

3.7.4 Communicating progress

It was thought that the coalition had not been able to build a consensus on what one senior advisor called “the change model” and an official described as “the ability to describe what 70% what looks like”. As one European campaigner said:

“I don’t think there were enough internal negotiating texts. I don’t think they had forged the red-line common negotiating positions among themselves.”

As a result, when it came to the G8 response, the coalition had not been able to play an effective co-ordinating role. It was felt that each coalition member had responded independently in the way it had thought best.

A special advisor summed up the government’s verdict on the G8 as:

“I felt we got a result, but it wasn’t perfect. I thought the NGOs would acknowledge it as a big step forward, with some understandable reservations.”

But the view within government and among many other interviews (as well as many grassroots campaigners) was that the response was overly critical and failed to acknowledge that any positive progress had been made.

Interviewees noted that this tension seemed to be based on an almost philosophical difference about how a campaigning organisation should communicate outcomes. One senior member of the government described the question as whether an organisation “chooses to own the victories” or “nurtures its sense of injustice”.

Politicians and policymakers also felt that a negative approach would not, in the long-term, progress the agenda.

“If you get to the stage where you end up saying that any pro-development outcome is a step backwards, then you might as well pack up and go home. And you do get that from some parts of the movement and not others.”

Regardless of what the response actually was it was felt that the coalition should be able to hold a consistent line. As one special advisor said:

“The G8 response was a real mess. The NGOs appeared to fall out with Bob, then with each other and then, in one case one NGO fell out with itself. But this was because it was set up in a way that encouraged them to use their own brands.”

Another effect was that an overly negative view did not acknowledge the contribution of all those who had been mobilised. This meant that those who had participated would be left cynical and unlikely to campaign again. As one advisor said:

“If you never give credit and never acknowledge progress, then you leave people with one of two views. Either the problem is intractable, or that people’s efforts are pointless.”

Focus group evidence does reveal public confusion about the outcomes of the G8. They described a “consistent feeling that no-one has a real idea of what G8 did/didn’t achieve”.

Interviewees thought that the coalition had acknowledged that the Gleneagles response could have been better managed. Some advisors pointed to the relative tone of the end-of-year verdict statements, which were felt to be “very different from what came out after Gleneagles. I still don’t agree with them, but at least we’re on the same playing field.”

Some from outside the government were relaxed about the criticism that the response had been too negative. One European campaigner said:

“I understand that there was anger from Number 10 about the NGOs response to the G8. Well that’s good. Our role is to push further than they are comfortable with”.

3.7.5 How a coalition engages with government

A number of media commentaries raised the issue of whether the coalition was “too close to government” and the potential negative consequences of this. Interviewees felt that some within the coalition also held this view and that this had led to internal tension.

The issue was largely dismissed by those interviewed inside and outside of government. In the view of one journalist:

“I never thought the campaign was too close. It was clear that at times the government was pretty annoyed with the campaign... [but] what would you rather have? Links with government or no links with government?”

This was supported by a senior advisor, who felt that the view that it was a captive campaign was “pretty childish” saying:

“They have to think what they want. If they are going to achieve outcomes then they are going to have to deal with people who have the power to make change.”

Many interviewed felt that some coalition members had been overly sensitive to that criticism and that had been one of the reasons that they had been critical at Gleneagles. One special advisor said:

“I think some of the NGOs weren’t mature enough to ride that criticism. They were intimidated by the accusation and felt that they couldn’t give any credit.”

Many felt that the credibility of some organisations within the coalition had not been served well by their public comments. As an opposition MP said:

“Responsible NGOs need to develop a carrot and stick approach if they want to be taken seriously. The “grown up” NGOs have done this in a way that doesn’t compromise their integrity. Those who engage in “yah-boo” politics have found that their credibility suffers as a result”

Another downside of what was felt to be an overly negative, hostile approach was that policymakers could begin to question the mandate of some organisations in terms of popular mandate, intellectual legitimacy and support from Southern groups.

However, in general, many politicians we interviewed were very positive about the way that the campaign had *“created the space for policymakers to do good work.”* One politician described the coalition as promoting a *“virtuous circle, where the government is encouraged to do the right thing”*. Many who talked in these terms also said that the Jubilee Debt Campaign had been similarly effective in its approach.

3.7.6 Public momentum

Whilst no one interviewed expected interest to be sustained at the levels achieved in 2005 and particularly in July, there was some concern about how the coalition would sustain momentum and whether there was a large public appetite for campaigning.

One MP described the end of the year as something of *“an anti-climax”* and that *“everything did rather seem to stop suddenly”*. One academic felt that

“After Gleneagles, it seemed to fizzle out. It was obviously drowned out by the London bombings, but the Millennium summit was a damp squib. Stuff kept happening, but it wasn’t really getting covered. For example, something like Hilary Benn’s shocks facility could be amazing, but it hasn’t really been covered.”

One academic identified this current lack of momentum as a *“post-2005 collapse”* saying:

“The whole [UK international development] community is having something of a post-2005 collapse. Its not just MPH. We’re asking what’s next, DFID are talking about a new white paper. But these issues haven’t gone away. Who’s going to hold these pledges to account?”

All interviewed thought that 2005 had proved that this interest could be mobilised and that long-term momentum for international development issues was possible but *“you have to create it for them.”*

There was agreement that the first step in building sustainable, long-term interest was that the public *“need to be made aware it’s an ongoing campaign”*. The first part of this was a clear communication of what had happened in 2005. Many identified the recent newspaper articles by Gordon Brown and Bob Geldof as examples of what they had been expecting and had not seen from the coalition. As one Minister said:

“I felt that there wasn’t a conclusion to the year that said to all those people – here’s what you’ve done, here’s what happened”

Even the most positive interviewed felt that *“there wasn’t a huge appetite among the public for international development”* whilst a journalist said that among his tabloid readership *“that there is a view that charity begins at home. When we ask them, issues like education, drugs and violent crime will still be way above Africa and trade justice in their list of priorities.”*

Others believed that there was public momentum, but that the campaign lacked the ability to harness it. It was suggested that because the coalition lacked an institutional structure, it would find it hard to capture the lessons of the year and hold the pledges of 2005 to account.

3.7.7 International effectiveness

The campaign was perceived as British, and as having significant influence with the British government, but less presence internationally. The key question, according to one minister, was:

“How do you build a global campaign to address global poverty?”

There are two reasons to focus on international effectiveness:

- Influencing global policy requires a global presence, especially in forums like the WTO and EU. Progress on trade will require a multilateral consensus
- The greater the involvement of Southern groups, the greater the legitimacy of the coalition’s policy demands

GCAP was felt to be the first step in this globalisation. However, it was not thought that the GCAP coalition had made a significant impact internationally during 2005. Nor, during 2005 was it thought to be a representative coalition at an international level (in terms of

size, scale and consensus) in the way that **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** had been in the UK.

It was noted by one advisor that the campaign “*helped set up GCAP and supported efforts in Germany and Japan*”, whilst a GCAP spokesman described how the campaign’s approach, with its broad coalition and communication strategy was proving to be a popular model for coalitions around the world.

There were some suggestions in media commentaries that as an explicitly UK-led campaign, it had lacked international authority, especially with Southern countries. (Some of this criticism seemed to suggest that any campaign, simply by originating in the UK, would lack credibility.)

Other more practical commentary suggested that a campaign could originate in the UK, but would need strong support from civil society in Southern countries. One journalist suggested that the coalition had not been open to African diaspora groups in the UK and that this had created some suspicion.

This perception was compounded by the Live8 line-up, which was thought to have lacked African acts. According to one journalist “*it made it look like they were saving Africa from the Africans.*”

The argument against this was that the focus of Live8 was political pressure, rather than showcasing African acts. As one journalist close to Live8 said “*Geldof didn’t care that there were no African acts and thought that it would be political correctness to do so. He said that the agenda was about influencing the G8 leadership and that was about persuading a million kids in Japan not to turn over.*”

Some pointed to the endorsement of the Commission for Africa by the African Union as an example of how Southern (and in particular African) support was an important factor in building credibility for campaigns of this sort.

Perceptions of local campaigners



4 Perceptions of local campaigners

4.1 Summary

Local campaigners were most impressed with the public awareness achieved by the campaign. They felt that this, alongside the brand and unity of the coalition, gave them a catalyst to work together locally. However, because they are so pleased with what was achieved, they are massively concerned about next steps and public momentum. Many felt that the major agencies were responsible for the fragmentation of the coalition and should work hard to preserve it.

This section describes the views of grassroots campaigners about the outcomes of the year, what brought them together and what it was like working with the coalition. It also captures their views on how the coalition should go forward.

4.2 Achievements of 2005

The main achievements of 2005 in the eyes of campaigners were felt to be:

- The public awareness achieved in the year
- The way that the campaign provided a catalyst for working together
- The breadth and scale of campaigning actions

4.2.1 Public awareness

Campaigners felt that the best thing about 2005 was the massive public awareness, which was described as “*stunning*” and “*fantastic*”. Among the general public, it had achieved “*huge name awareness*” and that this had been achieved with “*slick marketing*” that had had a “*touch of class*” about it. Whilst some of the less traditional campaigning methods “*might have rubbed [traditional campaigners] up the wrong way, it was amazing because it got so many people involved.*”

Campaigners were positive about the marketing and popular communications, because it had generated interest in their local events and given them encouragement. Many noted how much easier it had been to get press coverage for their events. Some noted that campaigning had been a “*pretty lonely business in the past*”, but this year had been different, because they felt that the public were on their side and that there was “*real evidence of the widening reach of the message.*”

4.2.2 Bringing together local groups

Campaigners were more impressed with the coalition unity and the umbrella message because it gave them a catalyst to work together. They particularly liked the fact that the campaign brought “*the three strands joining together against poverty*”.

As a result, the organisers of much of the local work were existing campaigners who heard the “*rallying cry*” of **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** and committed to work together. Many interviewed came from existing campaign networks – particularly the Jubilee Debt

Campaign, Fair Trade movement and church groups. One described the campaign as a “*maturing of the Drop the Debt campaign.*”

Many noted that events that were organised by existing local groups used the umbrella **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** branding rather than their established names. This was because “*there was an incredible deference to the larger agenda*” that had made building local coalitions much easier.

Whilst the organisers might have been the veteran campaigners, it was thought that many new participants from “*all areas of society*” had been attracted to the campaign. One local group noted that membership had increased by 66% in the year, despite the fact that their events did not carry local branding.

4.2.3 Wide range of campaign actions

Campaigners described a wide range of activities over the year. One of the positive effects of the year was that the brand was simple and the coalition was loose enough to let them be creative about their own campaigning ideas.

Local groups talked about wrapping their churches in white bands, events at local fairs, cycle rides, vigils and meetings with local MPs.

Campaigners felt that national momentum dropped off in the second half of the year, but they continued with local events. There was an understanding that campaigns ebb and flow and that their continuing efforts sustained the message.

The Edinburgh rally was a major focus for campaigners and many were disappointed that it seemed to be overshadowed by Live8. Some felt that the events should have been on different days and others blamed the media for not linking the two events more clearly. But broadly campaigners were positive about Live8 as a means of engaging the wider public and young people.

They also found it easy to organise themselves locally, largely via email lists that they put together independently. Some felt that central resources to manage this would have been helpful.

4.3 Policy change

In general, campaigners views on policy change were broadly consistent with other external interviews.

It was felt that whilst some progress was made on aid and debt, little progress was made on trade. The general mood on trade was one of “*disappointment, but not disillusionment*” because they had proved in the year that campaigning worked.

It was also the view of campaigners that progress on trade was the most important of the

three areas.

However, many felt that the communication of the achievements of the year had not been good and that the agencies should have been more positive about communicating success in order to retain the interest of the new campaigners. According to one long-term campaigner:

“I know you’ve got to give a realistic evaluation, but my impression of the responses after the G8 was that the agencies were more negative in tone than they needed to be. I thought this from the point of view of those people new to campaigning and the effect on their morale...Then I felt [Bob] Geldof went the other way – he was too positive. It seemed like they were reacting to each other. I was looking for something in the middle.”

4.4 Working with the coalition

Campaigners understood that the campaign was a loose coalition with little central infrastructure. There were mixed views on this.

Some were very positive, saying that there were a variety of sources for information, support and materials. There was lots of praise for the web resources of various agencies and the mailing lists. Although this involved *“a lot of cross-referencing”*, this was fine because materials were consistent with each other.

Others were less supportive. They felt that support for local groups was not structured enough and that they had not been not integrated into the coalition, especially in terms of decision-making.

This manifested itself particularly in the end-of-year planning. Activists felt that they had a contribution to make to these debates, but that the decision-making structures had been dominated by the national agencies.

Small factors, like the timetabling and scheduling of meetings, were felt to have compounded this sense that they were not fully part of the coalition.

A number of interviewees noted that school resources could have been better prepared. Understanding development issues was now part of the school curriculum and campaigners noticed teacher’s *“taking their campaign resources in bag fulls”*. As the campaign had been successful in reaching out to young people, it was felt that it did not do enough to support schools more formally.

A number of people thought that campaign *“felt under-resourced”* and there was a missed opportunity to raise money by asking for a small contribution from the list. It was felt that this had been successful for the Jubilee campaign.

4.5 Concerns

As long-term campaigners, many interviewed felt that the widespread public awareness and the unity of the campaign was unprecedented. They also felt it was something they had been working for many years to achieve. As one campaigner said *“I’ve been campaigning for 30 years and I’m more optimistic and hopeful than ever before.”*

Therefore, their main concern was that all the hard work and momentum that had been built up behind the brand might be undone. The brand was *“so valuable”* according to one campaigner that it would be a *“travesty”* if it was wound up.

Some felt that the NGOs were winding down the campaign to serve their own interests. It was recognised that NGOs had committed resources throughout the year (and that some appeared to be a little *“burned out”*), but the end-of-year planning had not been clear. As a result, *“they had brought it on themselves”* because they *“haven’t learned the lessons of Jubilee”*.

It was felt that the change of name and structure of the Jubilee Debt Campaign was being replicated by the campaign and that this was a mistake.

Campaigners were particularly concerned that the mailing list was being wound up. It was felt that people had signed up to tackle *“poverty”* in its broadest terms and might not transfer to another group. One interviewee, who had campaigned for the first time in 2005, said that he was more likely to go back to being one of the *“benevolent masses”* than join an associated campaign group.

Some suggested the campaign could continue to work on the Millennium Development Goals.

Those who were most critical of the decision to wind up the campaign felt that their local groups would continue regardless of what happened nationally. They felt that there was still local momentum and that national agencies could not dictate how they would take the campaign forward.

Internal ways of working



5 Internal ways of working

5.1 Summary

This section of the evaluation analyses the structures, systems and procedures put in place by the coalition. It looks at their overall effectiveness, their contribution to specific, desired outcomes, and considers what lessons can be learned for future collaborative working.

To set this section in context, it is worth emphasising that in many respects **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** was an incredibly successful campaign. Whatever the internal setup, the campaign delivered unprecedented results.

This section is informed by a survey of all coalition members. Most respondents to the survey were overwhelmingly positive about ways of working.

The evaluation survey attempted to get a snapshot of what three things participants liked most about the campaign. The things most frequently mentioned were:

- Working with a wide range of organisations
- Mass mobilisation (including Edinburgh event + Mandela)
- High profile brand
- Awareness-raising on issues

Respondents were also asked to rank the extent to which the internal ways of working contributed to various objectives. The summary of views is presented in the following table:

EVALUATION SURVEY FINDINGS

How successful/effective was the coalition at:

	Excellent	Good	Satisfactory	Poor	Failed
Meeting objectives	20%	49%	26%	3%	2%
Mobilising and engaging	29%	44%	22%	5%	0%
Strategic Direction and Decision-Making	13%	44%	32%	11%	0%
Resolving Tensions*	7%	30%	50%	10%	0%

Based on 62 responses. Email survey, January 2006

* 3% don't know

Despite this generally positive message, many of those closest to the management of the campaign were frustrated by the ways of working and this was reflected in interviews, some of which were quite critical.

Interviewees believe that the ways of working contributed positively to mobilising a large and diverse coalition, and to maintaining its unity throughout the year. The flat, decentralised structure made it easy for people to get involved.

The trade-off in such a model is that the ways of working were not seen to have been effective in terms of strategic direction, decision-making and resolving tension between coalition members. This led to frustration and contributed to a loss of momentum during 2005.

While the adopted model was effective in harnessing the time and resources of member agencies, it was sometimes felt to have demanded too much. For others, the lack of transparency about relative contributions led to internal tension.

There was consensus that the adopted structure needed more of a central hub, and a majority believed that the campaign required greater leadership, though views varied on the pros and cons of having a single spokesperson.

There was little change in approach when the coalition grew in size and diversity. The ways of working were designed by the founding NGOs, for the founding NGOs. As result, some interfaces with non-NGO actors were poorly managed and some groups (for example Black and Minority Ethnic groups and diaspora organisations) were not effectively brought into the coalition.

In summary, respondents were very positive about the people who had been involved centrally in the campaign and mutual respect was high. There was also an understanding of why the campaign had been set up as it had been.

Nevertheless, many of the processes and structures hindered effective decision-making and people had to invest time, money and effort in trying to reach agreement.

The consequence of this is that whilst everyone surveyed would join a coalition like **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** again, the vast majority would demand conditions attached to their membership.

To satisfy this demand, future coalitions need to be clear with members about: what commitments are expected from them; how decisions are made; how resources are planned and how the trade-off between consensus and leadership is managed.

5.2 Contribution to achieving the goals of the coalition

Survey respondents were broadly agreed that the “ways of working” helped the coalition to meet its objectives. 69% rated it as good or better, including 20% who felt it was excellent in this regard. 26% felt it was satisfactory, a couple of respondents regarded it as poor and only one respondent felt **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** had failed in this regard.

On the basis of interviews, the evaluation considered in more detail how ways of working contributed to each of its stated goals:

5.2.1 Achieving policy change in 2005

Decision-makers confirm the campaign was seen to have contributed to policy change and it seems to have been the combination of different campaigning activities that made the difference. Ways of working encouraged this by empowering those with professional expertise to lead on their respective areas such as policy and lobbying work, mobilisation of activists and mass communications.

The one area in which both internal and external interviews suggest that the ways of working could have been more effective in relation to this objective was in paying more attention to the international stage, and placing less emphasis on policy change solely at a UK level.

While **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** came together as a coalition of UK organisations and its direct mandate clearly was to exert pressure on UK institutions, a number of interviewees commented that it had given insufficient attention to international political strategy, and to supporting embryonic coalitions elsewhere – for example, there was no GCAP Working Group, which could have taken on this role. By comparison, it was the international aspect of Live8 that many external commentators saw as offering real added value.

5.2.2 Creating an unstoppable momentum for further change beyond 2005

As the terms of reference note, it is difficult to make a final judgement at this stage as to whether or not **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** has genuinely contributed to this objective. What the evaluation has uncovered, however, is a clear internal consensus that the coalition struggled to maintain momentum throughout 2005.

The campaign lost momentum in the second half of the year, and interviewees have put forward a series of internal factors that contributed to this, which fall under three broad headings:

- A reduction in staff time and resources from some key players that had not been anticipated by those at the centre, or compensated for by increased contributions from others
- Growing disagreements and tension following the G8 response and on taking forward the trade agenda
- Loss of energy and enthusiasm for working together post-G8

While each of these may have been contributory factors, the main reason the campaign lost momentum in the second half of the year was simply that it did not have adequate plans in place.

Planning for White Band Day II was largely left until after the G8, when a combination of factors (e.g. exhaustion, summer holidays) limited the input of both time and resources. As a result, while there was significant activity internationally, White Band day II made little impact at national level in the UK. While those within the MAC Working Group charged with planning White Band Day III worked hard, they did so without the level of staff time and financial resources available pre-G8, and as a result, the planned activities in the

second half of the year were less ambitious and made less impact.

In terms of future lessons, three points emerge:

- Future coalitions need to plot staff time and resources across the entire campaign from the outset
- Failure to resolve internal disagreements reduces external effectiveness, so should be given higher priority
- Sustaining a campaign over a period of time requires pacing in order to avoid burn-out

Coalition members and core networks are responsible for maintaining the momentum generated by the campaign in the future. Unless they do, there is a real risk that momentum will be lost, and the coalition will ultimately be judged to have failed in this respect.

5.2.3 Creating a step change in British public backing for development.

The fact that the campaign achieved 87% public recognition within six months combined with high levels of public action is clear evidence of its success in this respect. So how did ways of working help to achieve this, and what lessons can be learned by future mobilisations?

Compared with previous coalition campaigns, **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** certainly made more and better use of mass, public communications.

Several of those interviewed in the evaluation acknowledged that Comic Relief had brought something special to the table in this regard, and that many of the high profile successes – the click ad, TV and cinema advertising, billboards – were essentially down to them. As one CT member mused, *“I’m not quite sure what it was that they brought but they did help us outreach beyond the normal audience”*. As another said *“the most exciting bits – the white band, the click ad, the name – were all down to Comic Relief”*.

At the same time, it was decisions around many of these mass-market communications that were the source of the deepest divisions between coalition members. Given that they clearly worked, the main learning for the future seems to be that NGOs should embrace these communications tools alongside their more traditional methods of communication if they genuinely want to reach out to a wider audience.

Two further observations are that:

- firstly, quite a lot of the mass, public communications were taken forward by people working outside the formal structures of the coalition;
- secondly, in the absence of a strong centre, there is no obvious place to capture detailed learning about what worked and what did not.

As a result, there is a real danger that these lessons will be lost and future campaigns should give more thought to putting in place structures to capture this information.

5.3 Contribution to the unity of the coalition

Given the breadth of the coalition, one of the key successes of 2005 was the fact that it held together. It did not suffer the Board level resignations experienced by Jubilee 2000, despite an arguably wider span of opinion and greater opportunity for tension.

The ways of working were thought to be important in this respect. One CT member said *“given the breadth of the movement, ways of working allowed it not to implode, and gave members licence to speak under MPH, which was good”*. Another noted that although there was a lack of discipline, no-one ever felt marginalised. This reduced the risk of members leaving the coalition.

Founding members also felt a sense of responsibility and ownership that made them stick with the coalition. As one put it, it would have been difficult to leave because *“it was where we live”*.

In practice, members realised that the scale of **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** made it difficult for any of the key players to leave. As one CT member put it, *“once it took off, it would have looked stupid to walk away”*.

Some interviewees felt that preserving unity and allowing diversity to flourish in the face of clear disagreements had a downside. As one put it *“did we go too much down the breadth and diversity route and then find the ideological divisions too wide to make us effective?”*

While unity was clearly vital to the campaign’s success, future coalitions do need to consider the inevitable trade-offs between maintaining the unity of a diverse group on the one hand with being organisationally effective on the other.

5.4 Contribution to the effective member engagement and mobilisation

Survey respondents judged the campaign to be particularly effective at engagement and mobilisation, with 29% ranking it as excellent, 44% ranking it as good and 22% ranking it as satisfactory. No respondents judged it to have failed in this regard.

The growth of the coalition from 40 to 540 members, the scale of the mass mobilisations – 22,000 in Trafalgar Square, 25,000 at the Trade Justice Wake Up event and a quarter of a million people in Edinburgh - and the fact that over 500,000 supporters joined the central **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** email list all point to the huge success of the campaign’s ways of working in this regard.

The outreach group estimates that while half of members joined as a result of proactive efforts, the other half asked to join spontaneously.

Similarly, while Edinburgh organisers thought they could account for around 60-70,000

activists being motivated to attend via traditional means (with the churches playing a particularly significant role), the final tally of a quarter of a million suggests other factors were at work. By contrast, the Mandela event attracted 22,000 people solely through mass publicity.

It seems likely that the public communications were a major factor in terms of organisational and public mobilisation. Again, this suggests that future campaigns should mobilise through mass communications as well as through more traditional, activist based means.

One of the aims of the campaign was to strengthen existing organisations and networks. However, some felt that the fact that the migration of supporters to the campaign groups did not happen until the end of the year was a serious mistake, despite the fact that it had been discussed as early as July. As one put it, “*supporters were not taken on a journey, they were put on a list*”. Planning for the legacy at the beginning is something that should be a priority for future coalitions.

5.5 Strengthening organisations and networks

As the migration of organisations and individual supporters from the coalition to its members and networks has only just begun, it is difficult to give a definitive view about the coalition’s success in this area. In terms of supporter recruitment during 2005, 64% of survey respondents were satisfied or completely satisfied with the coalition’s contribution, while 12% said recruitment was above expectations and 20% said it was below expectations. Statistics provided by individual agencies were as follows:

- Save the Children quadrupled its action network, albeit from a low base;
- ActionAid recruited 8,700 new campaigners and converted nearly 2,000 donors to campaigners;
- CAFOD recruited an additional 20,000 supporters;
- Christian Aid recruited 17,000 new supporters (but had recruited 14,000 in the previous year and was already on a upward trajectory);
- Oxfam recruited around 100,000 new supporters across its three campaigns (Make Trade Fair, Control Arms and MDGs) and estimates that half of these were brought in as a result of **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY**
- The World Development Movement (WDM) reported a 14.2% increase in active supporters – more than the previous year and above expectations;
- JDC reported a steady influx of supporters in 2005 that was consistent with previous years and have so far had around 2,000 inquiries from supporters migrating from the central list.

In terms of networks, the overall view from JDC was that **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** did strengthen them, securing more prominence for the issues, getting more people interested and taking political concerns forward. At the same time, it has cost a huge investment of staff time and led to some disaffection at local level around the legacy.

Concern was also expressed around heightened expectations of JDC that had yet to be matched by adequate funding from member organisations.

For TJM, being a network within a network did carry some costs and some noted that TJM had “*lost out to the superbrand*” in 2005. The view from the centre is that this was a price worth paying in order to raise awareness of trade justice. TJM does not recruit individual supporters but is planning a post-campaign recruitment drive of organisations.

Stop AIDS Campaign feel that they benefited significantly from membership of the coalition, particularly in terms of increased lobbying access and information. Around 25 new organisations joined Stop AIDS over the course of the campaign, and many as a direct result of it.

5.6 Suitability for effective decision-making

Survey respondents regarded the ways of working as being less effective with regard to strategic direction and decision-making than they were at achieving goals and mobilising, although 56% still ranked them as being good or better. Significantly, responses from CT members were less positive than the overall sample, with only 2 out of thirteen respondents judging them as good, 6 feeling they were satisfactory, 1 feeling they were in between good and satisfactory and 4 ranking them as poor.

This was mirrored by interviews with CT members, who expressed two different concerns about decision-making. Some felt that the agreed structure was not very good at taking decisions - “*slow, woolly, fudgy, frustrating*” was how one member described it, while others complained that decisions were “*ducked, parked elsewhere, re-opened or simply talked out*”.

Other CT members had a different perspective, saying that the real problem was not taking decisions but implementation. In the absence of a central secretariat, there were too few implementers, and within a committee-based structure that had no sanctions or management authority, it was difficult to ensure that agreed decisions were acted upon.

These points are illustrated by two specific examples of decision-making by the Coordination Team - Live8 and the G8 response:

5.6.1 Live8 and the 2nd July Rally

CT spent six to eight weeks discussing the pros and cons of continuing with the planned 2nd July Rally in view of a likely clash with Live8. While some CT members felt it was right to have taken so much time on this, as it was a critical decision, others clearly found it frustrating, especially as they felt that:

- CT lacked the necessary information to inform its decision
- Extensive discussion of this issue took place at the expense of other things, such as supporting the G8 group to organise the event, and paying more attention to the international scene.

Even today there is no consensus as to whether the final decision was right or wrong. Different CT members continue to make the case on both sides. The main lesson for the future seems to be that the coalition's ways of working were established by NGOs, for NGOs and were not well-suited to accommodating the subsequent plans of non-NGO actors.

5.6.2 The G8 Response

A second important example concerned the campaign's response to the G8, which has been criticised widely in government. Even now, there is little internal consensus on what took place and why.

In practice, the collective UK MPH response was largely ignored by the media, in favour of individual responses from inside and outside the UK coalition. This led to significant confusion all round. The media evaluation is better placed to consider this in greater detail, but for the purposes of this evaluation, the main learning points for the future would appear to be:

- that coalitions need to invest in more and better links with other key players who occupy the same media space;
- there should either be a single, joint response at key moments or individual agency responses – doing both makes no sense.

5.7 Efficiency and effectiveness for operational activity

This section considers two elements of operational effectiveness:

- Campaign Activity
- Campaign Budget and Resources

5.7.1 Campaign Activity

Most of the coalition's operational activity was led by the relevant Working Groups. General comments on these are given as an appendix. Where plans were put in place and people took on specific operational tasks, the general consensus appears to be that "*ways of working were not perfect, but they did get results*". The coalition did successfully organise the Mandela event, the Edinburgh Rally, the Wake Up to Trade Justice vigil and the mass lobby of Parliament.

Where operational activity was less successful, for example organising mass action around White Band Days II and III, – this seems to be either because no one was allocated specific responsibility, or where they were, they were not given the necessary resources. This was a failure of planning, rather than a failure of operational activity.

Additionally, there seem to have been some instances where operational activities were hampered by unclear mandates – for example, several people commented on the difficulty of organising stunts when responsibility was split between the MAC and Media Working Groups.

One idea that emerged from interviews was that multi-disciplinary project teams might work better than a series of functionally specific working groups. This would get around the problems of cross-group working and help with pacing overall effort. It would allow an unlimited number of task-specific groups to form and dissolve over time and not rely on the same individuals to do the bulk of the work.

5.7.2 Budget

The campaign operated on a central budget of under £1 million. Over a third of this came from a single donor (The Tom Hunter Foundation), while a further £100,000 was donated by the Co-Op. A record of members' contributions shows that only 76 of the 540 member organisations contributed to the budget, and half of these contributed £500 or less. Only 11 organisations made contributions of over £10,000 and with the exception of Unison, they were all large NGOs.

No cost allocation has been made in terms of the time spent by all parties. This is likely to have been significant and placed a heavy burden on many involved.

In the absence of a large central budget, many additional campaign activities were funded by further contributions from the key players, especially at Working Group level.

On the one hand, this allowed the campaign to harness significant additional resources from its members. On the other, some smaller members complained that this gave disproportionate influence to the major contributors.

While it is inevitable that some coalition members will always be in a position to contribute more than others, greater transparency about this in future might help to reduce the tensions that arise from this – although it is worth bearing in mind that if all funds were put into a central pot, overall contributions would almost certainly be significantly lower.

Inadequate central funding was seen to have been a problem, and while two non-NGO contributors blamed the agencies for their “meanness”, it was pointed out that no-one within the structure had overall responsibility for budget and fundraising.

In terms of future learning, the general view seems to be that the campaign should have expected more from its members in terms of financial contributions and greater clarity in terms of expectations around resources and responsibilities.

5.8 Effectiveness in resolving tensions between coalition members

On “resolving tension”, survey respondents' satisfaction with the coalition's ways of working fell, with only 37% judging it as good or better, although half (50%) regarded this as satisfactory and 10% regarded it as poor. Those closest to the centre (and most aware of internal tensions) were more negative, with 3 CT respondents ranking ways of working as good in this respect while 6 regarded it as satisfactory and 4 felt it was poor.

From interviews, it is clear that some CT members felt that fundamental differences – both ideological and strategic – between coalition members were not resolved and that this impaired overall effectiveness. These divisions were not generally about policy but campaign strategy. Tensions arose on positioning, both with the Government and with the public. As noted below, failure to resolve tension between members was most obvious within the MAC group, where many of these differences were played out over the course of 2005. Whilst these differences never became apparent to the public, it is clear that they were apparent to government and other opinion-formers.

While the consensual model was seen by many as being important in terms of maintaining unity, the trade-off appears to have been that because disagreements were avoided or not effectively dealt with, they kept resurfacing. As one interviewee put it *“consensus building and inclusiveness are important, but there needs to be a compromise between this and getting things done”*.

There was clear recognition that coalition working does represent the future, and that *“to be globally successful, we need to get really good at working in coalitions”*. Two CT members noted that coalition working is something that agencies do all the time. As another noted, rather than spending time trying to resolve differences, future coalitions need to *“get better at saying it’s OK to have people at different ends of the spectrum – then get on with it”*.

5.9 Relations with other national and international civil society actors

While it is a statement of fact rather than criticism, the campaign’s ways of working were essentially designed by the founding NGOs, for the founding NGOs. They underwent little modification over the course of the year, other than a couple of changes to the CT and a shift in the remit of the Outreach Group to Organisational Engagement.

Evaluation interviews with non-NGO actors point to the fact that outsiders frequently found the coalition’s ways of working frustrating. Two non-NGO members of CT both referred to the lack of discipline while one external communications expert clearly felt that as the year wore on, it became increasingly difficult to get things done within the existing structure.

Many of the things that made **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** special in 2005 were contributed by people outside the NGO sector, yet they had no formal position within the structure of the mobilisation. Future campaigns might want to make more use of professional expertise outside the NGO sector by co-opting additional people to the CT or to relevant groups.

RELATIONS WITH LIVE8

Relations with Live8 merit specific mention given their huge impact in 2005. A significant number of survey respondents identified this as a problem. The view from the inside was that the coalition had not invested sufficiently in the Live8 relationship and felt that in retrospect, this was a clear mistake.

As one CT member reflected “we should have gone the extra mile to bridge the gaps between the coalition and Live8 and we missed that opportunity”. While not underestimating the difficulties of managing this relationship, the coalition’s experience suggests that in future, NGOs must get better at working with those outside the sector that share the same goals.

With regard to relations with international actors, the main observation here is that the campaign did not invest heavily enough in this area, and this was recognised by both internal and external commentators.

5.10 Perceptions about the effectiveness of specific structures

As well as assessing impact, the evaluation attempted to capture how effective each tier in the mobilisation was seen to have been from the perspective of its participants.

5.10.1 The Coordination Team

The Coordination Team scored the highest rating in terms of overall effectiveness, with 80% of survey respondents ranking its performance as good or better, with 33% saying it was very good and 11% ranking it as excellent. There were thirteen survey responses from individuals and organisations who sat on CT and of these, three ranked it as very good, seven as good, one as fair and two as poor.

Senior level representation on CT was seen as a real strength, as was the level of professional respect – even in the face of some profound disagreements. As one CT member put it:

“There were brilliant people on CT – high calibre, senior, inspired, empowered – I do feel a bond even though I disagreed with them.”

As another member put it, *“the overall ethos was good, and things were done in good humour”*.

At the same time, CT members expressed considerable frustration with its meetings, describing CT as *“a talking shop”* with long discussions that failed to make clear decisions, too few votes and frequently re-opened debates.

Some would like to have seen more space for discussing political and strategic direction and felt there was insufficient time for this.

Different CT members played different roles, with some taking on significant operational

responsibilities while others did little in between meetings. Those that did not represent specialist development organisations felt there was little understanding of their limitations.

While unequal resource contribution is an inevitable feature of coalition work, future coalitions should perhaps seek greater transparency in this regard, with formal contracts for key players indicating what percentage of their time is available for coalition work.

This would also help to address the problem of overload, identified by several interviewees as a serious issue. CT membership was seen to have placed a huge strain on some individuals, for whom this commitment came on top of their day jobs within their own organisations.

This was felt to be particularly true for the chair, described as “*a real gem*” by one CT member and praised for doing “*an amazing job*” by another. A number of interviewees reflected that in future, chairing such a coalition should probably be regarded as a full-time job, while a couple suggested that in future, it would be worth considering formal, part-time secondments from all CT-level members to free them of some of their organisational responsibilities.

A couple of interviewees mentioned lack of organisational accountability by CT members as a problem, suggesting that at key moments, people sometimes appeared to be representing themselves, not their organisations.

CT consisted largely of NGO representatives, mainly drawn from the NGOs and networks who were the founder members. This was an inevitable consequence of the campaign’s early formation and development, and mid-way, CT did discuss the possibility of making changes but decided against on the basis that this was only a one year campaign. Nevertheless, a CT elected by an Assembly of 40 (mostly) NGOs looked increasingly unrepresentative of the rapidly expanding membership, and future coalitions should guard against this happening again.

5.10.2 The Assembly

Survey respondents rated the Assembly highly, with 78% ranking it as good or better. Of the 41 respondents who were actively involved in the Assembly, 5 rated it as excellent (12%), 9 rated it as very good (22%), 19 rated it as good (46%), 7 rated it as fair (17%) and only 1 rated it as poor (2%).

In interviews (all but one conducted before the final Assembly), a few CT members mentioned the importance of the Assembly with one describing it as “*a clever move that gave CT legitimacy beyond a self-selecting group*” while another referred to its usefulness in airing views and flagging issues.

Others, however, were more sceptical, with one CT member referring to the Assembly as offering only “*the pretence of democracy*” while in practice “*nothing the Assembly said or did changed anything that CT did.*” The same interviewee described the Assembly as a “*pseudo-democratic organisation*”, pointing out that CT had been elected by an Assembly

of 40 but had grown to 540, leaving the bulk of the membership unrepresented.

This CT member felt that high expectations had been raised about equal membership, while in practice, the original 20 or so organisations were the ones who had set it up and kept it going, and the bulk of the resources were put in by three or four organisations. It was therefore impossible for the campaign to be truly democratic, and perhaps a mistake to allow everyone to join on an equal basis. Two members of CT raised this point, both suggesting that future coalitions should make a distinction between founder members and those who joined subsequently.

Lack of clarity about the role and rights of the Assembly does seem to have caused problems. The original Terms of Reference stated that the Assembly was not only responsible for electing CT but also for advising and being consulted on strategy, and ratifying overall strategy and major decisions. Examination of the minutes of Assembly meetings suggests that in practice, it was largely a forum for information sharing, with the Assembly never invited to vote on CT proposals until the final meeting. By then, the problem was compounded by the fact that Assembly meetings had themselves become unrepresentative, typically attended by only around 60 of the 540 members.

At the final meeting, there were 73 voting members and 27 non-voting members present, and those were largely drawn from two groups, one representing the CT and another representing grassroots organisations, who wanted to keep **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** going. Key learning points to emerge from this are that future coalitions should give more thought to how links between the centre and the grassroots are supported and managed, and to ending the coalition appropriately if that is the intention from the outset.

With the benefit of hindsight, failure to consider amending the composition of CT, the rules governing membership and expectations about role of the Assembly in response to the phenomenal growth in membership were serious weaknesses.

Similarly, the growth in local, grassroots groups was a clear sign of success but centrally, the coalition did not respond to this until it was too late, with unfortunate consequences at the final Assembly. In some respects, it could be said that the coalition's ways of working failed to respond to its own success – a mistake that future mobilisations should learn from.

5.10.3 The Support Centre

While there was huge praise for BOND's role in providing support, there was almost universal consensus that the adopted model did not provide enough of a central hub. The following comment was typical of those questioned:

“BOND did a great job but we needed more of a core for day to day administration and less reliance on part-timers from among member agencies”.

While this led some interviewees to question the wisdom of deciding against a central secretariat, others were keen to explore a different model in future. The possibility of seconding agency staff to a central hub came up in several interviews, as did the option of having a slightly larger number of independently employed staff to undertake core functions such as media work and event organisation.

5.10.4 The Working Groups

75% of survey respondents rated the effectiveness of Working Groups as being good or better. However, detailed analysis points to a wide range of experiences. At one end of the spectrum, everyone agreed that the Policy and Lobbying Working Group was highly successful, whereas the Messages, Actions and Communications (MAC) Working Group was considered somewhat dysfunctional.

While each group seems to have been a unique experience for its members, some common themes have emerged from interviews with Working Group participants.

The common themes were all a result of the reasonably ad-hoc and informal nature of the groups. Successful groups worked well together, set their own agendas and have committed to work together in the future. Other groups fell dormant even during 2005.

Well-functioning groups were empowered by the freedom and flexibility they enjoyed to pursue their own agendas. Collectively, the groups succeeded in harnessing considerable energy from member organisations in terms of staff time and money. The flat structures and open membership encouraged participation, and there was seen to be real value in those with specific professional expertise (eg New Media, Celebrities) sharing experience with colleagues working in the same field

However, other groups struggled with a lack of central direction, administrative support and perceived lack of budget.

CT links to the groups were inconsistent and cross-group structures did not really exist. This led to difficulties with oversight, accountability and overlapping responsibilities.

The groups had variable membership and often consisted of relatively junior staff. Ever-changing participation in groups meant that time was often wasted in getting people up to speed. All groups had significantly more people registered via D Groups than ever attended meetings or played an active role, and while D Groups aided communication, there were undoubtedly some problems with “lurkers”.

As membership of the groups was self-selecting, there was no way of ensuring that the groups themselves reflected the views of the wider membership. As a result it could be argued that on occasions, the CT (which was democratically elected in the first instance) sometimes delegated key decisions to groups that were unrepresentative.

Lessons learned



6 Lessons learned

6.1 Summary

This section draws six lessons from 2005. To put them in context, as one special advisor said:

“Most lessons to take from the year are definitely positive. The question is how you can maintain this momentum now you’re in a different era.”

Future coalitions will be more successful if they develop a view about these issues at an early stage:

Leadership

- Coalitions need to understand the trade-offs between leadership and consensus

Planning

- Planning strategically – for the long term - is different from tactically responding to external conditions. Coalitions need to do both

Working with different types of organisation

- Different organisations have different needs. As coalitions grow, they need to accommodate diversity

Agreeing public and political positioning

- Campaigns need to agree their strategy on overall public and political positioning at the outset, or at least agree how to manage differences between members

Using popular communications tools

- Mass-market popular communications, backed up by solid lobbying and traditional activism, have significant political impact

Building relationships with supporters

- Campaigns need to plan to take new supporters on a journey from interest to activism

6.2 Leadership

Coalitions need to understand the trade-offs between leadership and consensus.

In any large coalition, there is a necessary trade-off between consensus and leadership. The breadth of the coalition demands a consensual approach. Key moments in the year demand a single voice and a clear decision.

The fact that the coalition held together over the year, that internal tensions never attracted significant media interest and that the energy of lots of committed people was harnessed by the campaign suggests a vindication of the leadership model.

However, the downside of the model is that there was no clear relationship between activity, accountability and responsibility. Some relationships were poorly managed and

most working on the campaign felt that they had contributed far more than they had intended. Others felt they had a contribution to make to decision-making, but found that they were not formally part of the decision-making structures. To some extent, the campaign model was something of an over-correction from previous models and more of a central hub and fewer ad-hoc arrangements would have been useful.

For example, a reflection of 2005 is that the coalition should have been comprised of formal secondments from the key agencies, rather than self-selecting groups of quasi-volunteers. Similarly, future coalitions should consider the establishment of specific task groups, under the direct control of CT, as an alternative to Working Groups.

Coalitions might also want to consider the option of a stronger central secretariat that provides core services, facilitates meetings, chases progress and takes on a policing role to ensure that members stick to what has been agreed. This model would be very different in style from that associated with a central secretariat under a single leader, but could provide many of the functions necessary to allow effective group leadership.

Coalitions should also explore different types of membership – that have different implications, responsibilities and expectations. Whilst the one-size-fits-all model of membership used in the campaign in 2005 promoted participation, it raised expectations and caused internal tensions.

It is a challenge for campaigners to work out how to manage the trade-off between centralisation and decentralisation.

The simple option is to have a centralised structure, which guarantees a single voice and a strong centre. However, most campaigning organisations show a clear preference for a more decentralised leadership structure.

Decentralised structures demand more discipline. They need clear processes and structures and they need to be able to change as circumstances change.

There needs to be a clear understanding of the work to be done, the resources and responsibility for carrying the work out, the mandate for oversight and the accountability to sign work off. If this work is not done in advance, it stores up problems once the campaign is underway.

6.3 Planning

Planning strategically – for the long term - is different from tactically responding to external conditions. Coalitions need to do both.

The coalition came together to make the most of the specific opportunities presented in 2005.

While it exceeded expectations in the first half of the year, activity dropped off significantly after the G8 as a result of poor planning. Future campaigns need to plan activities across the course of the entire campaign, and be clear about the staff time and resources available throughout from the outset.

During 2005, parts of **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** were tactically excellent. For example, the media coverage demonstrated a level of creativity and a speed of reaction that should be a model for future campaigns.

However, it seems that more could have been done to situate the work done in 2005 within the context of an ongoing campaign against global poverty. A number of issues seem not to have been given enough attention during the planning phase. Some examples are:

- How new supporters engaged by the coalition would be migrated into other agencies and networks
- How new supporters would be taken on a journey from simple, popular messages to deeper levels of engagement
- How the lessons of 2005 would be captured and disseminated
- How the pledges of 2005 would be held to account

Without this strategic vision, the work of 2005 could be seen as the high-water mark of development campaigning, rather than the foundation of a genuinely global campaign.

One of the problems of the campaign structure was that it was not always clear where responsibility for political and strategic direction resided. The natural home for this work was the CT, but it spent much of its time building consensus around operational decisions rather than questions of strategy.

Future coalition work (even when focussed on specific moments and events) should recognise and allocate responsibility for this vital strategic role.

6.4 Working with different types of organisation

The campaign drew strength and credibility from the size and diversity of the coalition. The lesson of 2005 is that coalition working is tough, but worthwhile.

The success of the campaign makes the case for reaching out to broader parts of civil society. The model is being replicated around the world by GCAP coalitions.

In many ways, the model was a victim of its own success. It was designed for 40 members of similar approach and background. It had to cope with 540 members from all corners of civil society.

Few institutions would be able to handle this growth without change.

However, many of the ways of working were not set up to suit non-NGO coalition members. If coalitions want a diverse membership, this needs to be factored into the way the coalition is run.

The campaign effectively harnessed the efforts of a number of professionals from non-NGO backgrounds. Whilst the outcomes were good, there is room for improvement in the way that campaigners engage and manage professionals and other experts.

Future coalitions also need agreed processes for amending their ways of working as conditions change. For example, the emergence of local groups in 2005 was unexpected and the structures were unable to offer them an effective role in decision-making.

6.5 Agreeing public and political positioning

Campaigns should agree their overall political and public positioning from the outset, or at least agree on how differences between them are going to be resolved and managed. Not doing this can lead to continued internal disagreement.

Within a broad-based campaign there will be members who have different views on strategy. Members will also position themselves in different places, both politically and with the wider public. This is entirely appropriate. The diversity of the coalition was a great strength of 2005.

However, when campaigners come together in a coalition, there needs to be clear agreement about the public and political positioning of the coalition itself. Common communications are stronger than fragmented and conflicted messages.

Coalition members need to recognise that the positioning of a broad-based campaign may not exactly match their own positioning. No coalition can work on the basis that its individual members are constantly competing to be the single authentic voice of the coalition.

In terms of public positioning, there were differences within **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** between those with expertise in mobilising activists and those with expertise in communicating with the mass public. This led to some internal tension about messages.

On the issue of political positioning the majority of those interviewed externally and internally rejected claims that **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** was a co-opted campaign. However, this was nevertheless a concern for some within the coalition.

The evaluation confirms that it was the portfolio of activities that contributed to the coalition's success, including successful lobbying and outsider campaigning. The diversity of the coalition was also a strength.

However, future coalitions should be more explicit about the “coalition position” and how that position will be agreed and communicated. Members should sign up to and respect that position, rather than try and compete with it.

6.6 Using popular communications tools

Mass-market popular support, backed up by solid lobbying and traditional activism, has significant political impact.

What made **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** different was the portfolio of popular communications tools that made the brand and the message unavoidable over the year.

The campaign engaged people who had never been engaged before. It stiffened the resolve of traditional activists and dominated press and parliament to the exclusion of almost of all other issues. Importantly, these popular messages were backed up by solid policy research and traditional activism.

Future coalitions have to establish a similar communications strategy, using skilled professionals, popular marketing techniques and a range of communications materials.

Success is a question of skills and attitude. Campaigning organisations are typically more comfortable talking to their members and less confident talking to popular mass-market audiences. There is also a reluctance to reduce complex issues to simple messages. However, if a campaign has a plan to take supporters on a journey from simple messages to engaged activism, it need not fear simplicity.

It is also a question of attitude. Campaigning organisations have a tendency to scrutinise every decision and communication. The media will not wait for this. Rather, time should be invested in developing a clear and focused communications brief at the planning stage. This should lead to management by exception and an investment of trust in skilled professionals who can get the job done.

6.7 Building a relationship with supporters

Campaigns need to plan to take new supporters on a journey from interest to activism.

The campaign was incredibly successful at triggering public interest in international development issues. It is not clear that the campaign had a clear plan for building a long-term relationship with new supporters.

The lack of detailed planning before 2005 for what would happen to the list of supporters and the brand after 2005 seems to be a missed opportunity for laying the foundations of a long-term campaign.

Future campaigns should not miss this opportunity. As well as using popular tools to sign up new supporters, there should be a clear plan for taking these supporters on a journey towards engaged activism.

As part of this, campaigns need to target different messages at different audiences. For example, traditional campaigners are most likely to be resistant to new, popular approaches like the use of celebrities and TV shows, because they consider their messages simplistic and “dumbed down.” Campaigns need to explain to existing activists why popular approaches are used and how they can be used to recruit new activists.

For example, if a campaign is planning a TV broadcast (like the Vicar of Dibley in 2005), traditional supporters and activists could be emailed about this in advance and provided with conversation points, next steps and campaign materials that will help them turn the passively engaged into the next generation of activists.

This demands relationship-building skills that are typically found in the private sector, rather than in NGOs. However, consolidating this public support is vital to sustained political pressure.

What Next?



7 What next?

In 2005, **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** achieved an unprecedented public mobilisation that achieved real policy change. However, meeting the challenge of global poverty requires a sustained, long-term and global effort.

To support this effort, the coalition needs to consolidate the work of 2005 and use it as a platform for future campaign activity.

This section documents what the coalition has decided in terms of next steps and what interviewees felt should be the highest priority for those who were taking forward the campaign's messages and objectives.

Most interviewees were unaware of the plans that the coalition has since put in place. Therefore this evaluation is unable to verify whether these plans, as announced, will adequately meet these objectives.

7.1 What is happening next?

The final meeting of the **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** Assembly took place on 31st January 2006. The final decisions are included as an appendix but in summary it agreed:

- That the core networks (TJM, JDC, UKAN, StopAIDs, BOND and the TUC) would form the heart of future campaigning on economic justice, leading on their respective areas and working together where issues or targeted decision-makers overlap, and that they may consider using the **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** brand consistent with agreed guidelines;
- That member organisations of **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** would be encouraged to join these networks or be supported by BOND to continue their engagement with economic justice, with BOND organising twice yearly forums, maintaining a database, producing a regular newsletter and preparing tool-kits;
- That BOND and Comic Relief would act as guardians of the **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** brand, including making decisions about its future use;
- That BOND would ensure UK representation on GCAP and share information about GCAP activities;
- That Assembly members may continue to use the brand and name in accordance with agreed guidelines, essentially allowing them to recognise 2005 as a special landmark moment, and to invoke the power and spirit of the campaign in 2005 for future campaigning;
- That the UK will follow GCAP's lead on future use of the white band;
- That individuals who joined the **MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY** website be given the opportunity to opt in to a central email list until the end of July 2006, during which time they would be encouraged to sign up with campaigning organisations.

7.2 Views on next steps

During the course of this evaluation, interviewees both inside and outside the coalition gave their views on what they thought the coalition should do next.

The recommendations can be divided into two categories: consolidating the work of 2005 and using 2005 as a platform for future, global campaigning.

Consolidate the work of 2005

- Retain the coherence of the campaign against global poverty
- Keep pressure on the UK government
- Keep communicating with the public, especially the newly engaged

Use 2005 as a platform for a global campaign

- Take forward the debate on trade
- Put pressure on G8 and EU countries
- Help build capacity in Southern civil society

In general, these recommendations were made without actual knowledge of the campaign's future plans.

Different groups of interviewees had different priorities. However, there was consensus across all interviewees that the campaign had not yet done enough to communicate its plans.

7.3 Consolidate in the UK: Coherence, Pressure and Communication

7.3.1 Retain the coherence of the campaign against global poverty

It was the view of many outside the coalition – from MPs and the government to local campaigners, that much of the value of the year came from the coherence of the coalition.

Losing this to fragmented communications on specific issues would be a great setback. As one MP said:

“Gladstone said, “Everyone has their favourite Balkan state”. There’s a risk that all this work that has been done tying the agenda together is undone. The coherence of the message will be lost. People will fall into a tick box mentality.”

MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY attempted to address the fundamental causes of global poverty. If this coherence is lost, it was thought that the development community would be pushed back into an “ambulance-chasing” mentality that was reactive and gained media attention only during a humanitarian crisis.

2005 proved that structured campaigns that promote a common agenda could mobilise the public and achieve policy change.

Local campaigners also felt that the coherence of the campaign provided them with a catalyst for working together and were keen for this to be preserved.

7.3.2 Keep up the pressure on the UK Government

Many in government expressed some surprise that the coalition had not articulated how it would hold the government to account on the G8 commitments.

Coalition members also expressed that this was a priority for them. However, most felt that this future focus on the UK would be less important relative to the importance of applying pressure on the EU other G8 governments.

Nevertheless, one of the prizes of 2005 was a greater cross-party consensus on development issues. Coalition members need to continue to apply pressure on the UK government and in parliament to sustain this. Their main task is *“to hold the promises of Gleneagles to account,”* especially as Gleneagles was *“the only game in town”* when it comes to the Millennium Development Goals.

One special advisor felt that the UK government still offered many avenues for campaigning. He suggested that the development community look at *“the things we do [as a government] that impact the opportunities for development.”* This means working with other departments, such as Health and the MoD and challenging them to *“integrate all of our policies around the development agenda.”* Examples included *“the supply side of corruption”*, tax havens, the scramble for oil in Africa and the *“poaching of qualified workers”*.

Pursuing this agenda would remove *“some of the crazy inconsistencies in our foreign policy”* and would recognise that the world is *“interdependent and a closed-loop system”*.

Others also suggested that the UK government should be made to acknowledge that efforts on aid and debt and trade were undermined by actions taken in the name of defence and resources.

7.3.3 Keep communicating with the public

Coalition members have a duty to keep communicating with the people who have been engaged and mobilised. It was felt, especially among external interviewees from all backgrounds, that the coalition had not yet done enough to build a relationship with new supporters.

As one minister said:

“If you’re Coca Cola, you don’t say that because you’ve won the battle with Pepsi you stop your marketing campaign. Likewise with election campaigns. The question is: How do you build and sustain relationships?”

It was felt that this element may well be overlooked, but was crucially important to winning hearts and minds in the long-term. An MP said:

“It is a very precious thing to have motivated millions of people. It puts a heavy responsibility on those who motivated them to nurture them and take them on a journey.”

A number of MPs who took a special interest in democratic renewal, saw the campaign as a successful example of how people now choose to become involved in the political process. For them, communicating and nurturing this new base of supporters was one of the most important things the campaign had to do.

7.4 2005 as a platform: Take forward the debate on trade

There was general agreement that for all the progress on aid and debt, it would be progress on trade that would make substantial differences to global poverty. There was also agreement that changing trade policy had been the area where least progress had been made.

There were many reasons given for this and no consensus about which of the factors were the most important. This section outlines the main reasons given by interviewees inside and outside the coalition.


All agreed that making progress on the trade agenda will be hard. The diagram below consolidates all of the factors that were thought to make achieving trade justice more difficult than making progress on aid and debt.

In summary, there was broad agreement on the following propositions:

- The structures for promoting trade justice are slow and Byzantine
- There is little international consensus about trade issues
- The coalition is not putting the UK government under clear and consistent pressure (though reasons differed as to why that was the case)
- Some feel it is harder to campaign on trade, as it lacks ‘hooks’ and clear outcomes

According to one MP, more work needed to be on the trade agenda because *“the trade issues, politically, intellectually and practically, haven’t been won”*. Some within the coalition felt that a consensus existed and was expressed clearly in the manifesto. Others, both within the coalition and outside it, thought that the consensus was less robust and needed more work to enjoy widespread popular and political support.

THE CHALLENGE OF ACHIEVING POLICY CHANGE ON TRADE
(REASONS INTERVIEWEES GAVE FOR THE LACK OF PROGRESS ON TRADE JUSTICE)



It is important to note that this model documents all of the reasons that interviewees felt that the trade campaign was more difficult than other campaigning areas. It does not prioritise or validate any of these views.

However, given the widespread agreement among external interviewees about the perceived lack of consensus, it seems the first step is to revisit whether there genuinely is a common vision among campaigners around the top priorities for trade justice.

From this baseline, campaigners need to work out how to build an international consensus for this manifesto. It was also thought that a lot of work needed to be done to make trade a resonant and compelling issue with the public. One tabloid journalist remarked that as trade was a complex and abstract argument, it was harder to make the case for it in popular communications.

7.5 2005 as a platform: Put pressure on G8 and EU countries

There was agreement that continued campaigning in the UK without similar work internationally would not yield significant further dividends. The UK is one of 25 in the EU and the EU is just one bloc at the negotiating table.

There was particular support for this view among members of government and parliament.

Campaigners need to build an international consensus for their programme to address global poverty. For some, this meant lending resources and expertise to those countries that did not have the scale and capacity for this sort of campaigning. Others, particularly from within the coalition, were concerned about their mandate for action internationally and supported a more passive role, supporting those international networks that had already been established.

It was felt that the Gleneagles agreement offered a clear opportunity to build awareness and sustained public pressure in the G8 countries. As one senior advisor said:

“There is a framework of new commitments that have never been made before, by so many people and in part, that came about as a consequence of public pressure. That public pressure should now be used to hold those commitments to account.”

The EU, according to many was “*the big game*” and the greatest opportunity to apply pressure. Some felt that the best way to pressure the US was to build a consensus in the EU and use that as a lever. However, this was a long way off and requires “*a shift in opinion in the southern member states.*”

As part of this, campaigners needed to develop their understanding of how the EU worked in practice. For example, the institutional separation of development and trade in the Commission was felt to be a real practical hurdle to linking trade and development successfully.

However, the public consensus had to be “shifted, rather than confronted”. As one journalist said:

“We need to see their point of view. We need to understand how we can help the French support their farmers in a way that doesn’t distort international markets. We need to find a way to help Chirac move forward.”

7.6 2005 as a platform: Help support Southern civil society

Some academics and journalists felt that the challenge was to build the capacity of civil society in the South. This was particularly the view of those who had not been involved in the campaign. The sense was that this would lead to increased domestic pressure on governments to commit to development.

Some African campaigners felt that this would be difficult, because the public mindset in their country was to trust the government. They felt that their campaign had been looked on with suspicion because *“the people don’t believe that they are poor and they keep asking us why the government isn’t involved in what we are saying.”*

Those who mentioned this area as a priority did not have a clear idea how to build capacity in Southern civil society, but it was felt that the NGOs, with resources placed in country, were as well placed as anyone.

However, there was a strong view from within the coalition that there were international structures and actions already in place. They also raised the question of their mandate to pursue such activity. It was interpreted by some as a call for UK agencies to “create Southern actions” which was considered to be too ‘top-down’ to be successful.